In the memory of our people, this day will remain not as an ordinary day of summer, but as the day of the beginning of the most terrible and bloody war in the history of the country and in world history.
Real photographs of June 1941.

Hero of the defense of the Brest Fortress, commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment of the 42nd Infantry Division, Major Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov (1900 - 1979).

P.M. Gavrilov led the defense of the Eastern Fort of the Brest Fortress from June 22 to July 23, 1941. He managed to rally around himself all the surviving soldiers and commanders of various units and divisions, closing the most vulnerable places for the enemy to break through. Until June 30, the fort's garrison offered organized resistance, staunchly repelling countless enemy attacks and preventing him from breaking into the fort. After the enemy used high-power aerial bombs and destroyed part of the fort's buildings, the Germans managed to break into the fort and capture most of its defenders.

From the beginning of July, Major Gavrilov and the surviving soldiers switched to the tactics of surprise attacks and attacks on the enemy. On July 23, 1941, he was seriously wounded by a shell explosion in the casemate and was captured unconscious. He spent the war years in Nazi concentration camps in Hammelburg and Revensburg, experiencing all the horrors of captivity. Liberated by Soviet troops in May 1945 at the Mauthausen concentration camp. He passed a special test and was reinstated to his military rank. But at the same time he was expelled from the party due to the loss of his party card and being in captivity, which played a negative role in his future fate. Since the fall of 1945, he was the head of the Soviet camp for Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia during the construction of the Abakan-Tayshet railway. In June 1946 he was transferred to the reserve.

In 1955, he finally found his wife and son, whom he had separated from under bombs in the first hour of the war. In 1956, the book by S.S. was published. Smirnov “Brest Fortress”, based on factual material. This event had a favorable effect on Gavrilov’s fate. He was reinstated in the party and was presented with the country's highest award.

On January 30, 1957, for the exemplary performance of military duty during the defense of the Brest Fortress in 1941 and the courage and heroism displayed, Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The city of Molotovsk at the hour of declaration of war. Filming location: Molotovsk. Time taken: 06/22/1941. Author: B. Koshkin

View of Belomorsky Avenue in Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Region) at the hour of declaration of war. In the distance you can see a crowd of people in front of the city House of Soviets, where the first volunteers were registered. The photo was taken from house No. 17 Belomorsky Prospekt.

On Sunday morning, June 22, 1941, a Komsomol-youth cross-country race was held in Molotovsk. At noon, V. Molotov made a speech, in which he officially announced the treacherous attack of Germany. The performance was repeated several times. Some time later, Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were issued, announcing the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 in the Arkhangelsk Military District and introducing martial law in the Arkhangelsk region. By evening, a mobilization point was deployed in Molotovsk. During the first three days of its work, in addition to those liable for military service, 318 volunteers arrived.

The city was founded just five years before the start of the war, but its contribution to the overall Victory was significant. Over 14 thousand Molotovites went to the front, over 3.5 thousand died on the battlefields. The 296th reserve ski regiment, the 13th separate ski brigade, and the 169th cadet rifle brigade were formed in the city. In Molotovsk there was a strategic port for receiving Lend-Lease convoys. In the city, 741 thousand rubles were collected for the “Arkhangelsk Collective Farmer” tank column, 150 thousand rubles for the “Molotov Worker” air squadron, 3,350 thousand rubles for two cash and clothing lotteries, a loan for 17 thousand rubles was realized, by February 1942, 1,740 thousand rubles were collected in cash and 2,600 thousand in bonds for the defense fund. By October 1, 1941, 9,920 items were received from Molotovites to be sent to the front; sending gifts to Red Army soldiers was widespread. The city housed three evacuation hospitals of the Karelian Front (No. 2522, 4870 and 4871). In the winter of 1942, part of the team of the Leningrad Komsomol Theater arrived in the city along the “road of life”; in total, over 300 evacuees were accepted. Throughout the war, Molotov Plant No. 402 built large submarine hunters of Project 122A, completed construction of submarines of the “M” and “C” types, repaired Soviet and foreign ships, fired 122,262 armor-piercing shells, 44,375 high-explosive bombs, 2,027 sets of sea trawls .

Source: Severodvinsk City Museum of Local Lore.

Head nurse of the surgical department of the Brest Fortress hospital Praskovya Leontyevna Tkacheva with the wives and children of the Red Army commanders, surrounded by German soldiers. Time taken: 06/25-26/1941.

Soviet amphibious tanks T-38, destroyed in the Brest Fortress. Location: Brest, Belarus, USSR. Time taken: June-July 1941

In the front is a vehicle manufactured in 1937 with an armored hull and turret produced by the Podolsk plant named after Ordzhonikidze. In the background is another T-38 tank. The tanks are located on the territory of the citadel next to the White Palace. The military equipment of the 75th separate reconnaissance battalion of the 6th rifle division of the 28th rifle corps of the 4th army of the Western Front was also located there, the armored vehicle fleet of which was located on the bank at the fork of the Mukhavets river.

German firing points in the Brest Fortress. Time taken: 06/22/1941

After the failure of the surprise capture of the Brest Fortress, the Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.

Registration of volunteers for the Red Army at the Oktyabrsky District Military Commissariat of Moscow. Duty officer of the Oktyabrsky district military registration and enlistment office P.N. Gromov reads the statement of volunteer M.M. Grigorieva.

Filming location: Moscow. Time taken: 06/23/1941.

Soviet light tank BT-7, destroyed on June 23, 1941 during the battle in the Alytus area. Location: Lithuania, USSR. Time taken: June-July 1941.

A vehicle from the 5th Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front. In the background is a damaged German Pz.Kpfw tank. IV Ausf. E from the 7th Panzer Division of the 39th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group of General Hoth.

Flight commander of the 145th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Petrovich Mironov (1918-1943) with an I-16 fighter.

V.P. Mironov had been in the Red Army since 1937. After graduating from Borisoglebsk VAUL in 1939, he was sent to the 145th IAP. Participant of the Soviet-Finnish war.

Participant of the Great Patriotic War from the first days.
By September 1941, the flight commander of the 145th IAP, senior lieutenant Mironov, had flown 127 combat missions and personally shot down 5 enemy aircraft in 25 air battles. Bombing and assault strikes caused great damage to enemy personnel and equipment.
On June 6, 1942 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
From November 1942 - as part of the 609th IAP, commander of the 2nd AE. Until February 1943, he made 356 combat missions, shot down 10 enemy aircraft personally and 15 in a group.

Soldiers and commanders of the Red Army inspect a captured German Flammpanzer II tank. Time of shooting: July-August 1941. Author: Georgy Petrusov

Soldiers and commanders of the Red Army inspect the captured Flammpanzer II flamethrower tank in the Western direction. On the fender there is an installation of smoke grenade launchers. By June 22, 1941, the 100th and 101st flamethrower tank battalions of the Wehrmacht were equipped with Flammpanzer II flamethrower tanks.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Galkin (02/12/1917 – 07/21/1942).

Born at the Kochkar mine in the Chelyabinsk region, in a working-class family. He graduated from the workers' school and worked as a mechanic. Since 1936 in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1937 he graduated from the Voroshilovgrad Military Aviation Pilot School. Participant of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 - 1940. Made 82 combat missions. In May 1940 he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Since 1941, Lieutenant M.P. Galkin has been in the active army. He fought on the Southern, Southwestern and Volkhov fronts. Until August 1941 he served as part of the 4th IAP, flying I-153 and I-16. At the beginning of August 1941, on the Crimean Isthmus, he was seriously wounded in one of the air battles. By August 1941, the flight commander of the 4th Fighter Aviation Regiment (20th Mixed Aviation Division, 9th Army, Southern Front), Lieutenant M.P. Galkin, flew 58 combat missions, conducted 18 air battles, and shot down 5 enemy aircraft.

From February to July 1942 he fought in the 283rd IAP, where he flew the Yak-7. In January 1942 he was sent to Novosibirsk for instructor work. On March 27, 1942, for courage and military valor shown in battles with enemies, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. From June 1942, he fought on the Volkhov Front as part of the 283rd IAP, where he flew the Yak-7. He won a few more victories.

On July 21, 1942 he died in an air battle in the Kirishi area. He was buried in a mass grave in the urban village of Budogoshch, Kirishi district, Leningrad region.
Awarded the orders of Lenin, Red Banner, Red Star. A street and a secondary school in the city of Plast, Chelyabinsk region, are named after him. In the city of Plast, on the Alley of Heroes and the urban village of Budogoshch, a bust was erected.

Soviet heavy tank KV-2 from the 6th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps of the North-Western Front, knocked out on July 5, 1941 in the battle for the city of Ostrov. Filming location: Pskov region. Time taken: June-August 1941.

The vehicle was manufactured in June 1941, serial number B-4754. The surviving decommissioning certificates about the KV-2 tank No. 4754 said the following: “The tank was hit - the caterpillar was broken, which fell off. The shell pierced the side armor of the transmission and damaged the control rods and side clutches, making the tank impossible to move. Since the damaged and burning tanks clogged the passage of the bridge, withdrawal was impossible due to the damaged control of the tank and the fallen tracks, and the tank was not able to turn around. The battalion commander gave the order to get out of the tank, while he himself remained in the vehicle to disable the tank. The further fate of Captain Rusanov is still unknown; the rest of the crew returned to the unit. The battlefield was immediately occupied by the enemy and the evacuation of the remaining vehicle from the battlefield became impossible.”

Tank crew: vehicle commander Captain Rusanov, driver Zhivoglyadov, gun commander Osipov, radio operator Volchkov, loader Hantsevich.

The commander of the 1st squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, Mikhail Vasilyevich Avdeev (09/15/1913 - 06/22/1979) next to his Yak-1 fighter. Time taken: 1942. Author: Nikolai Asnin

From June 1941 he took part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. He fought the entire war in the 8th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which in April 1942 was renamed the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment. At first he was deputy squadron commander, from January 1942 he became squadron commander and from April 1943 to November 1944 he commanded a regiment. By June 1942, Mikhail Avdeev had made more than three hundred combat sorties, shot down 9 enemy aircraft in 63 air battles, and also caused significant damage to enemy troops with assault strikes.

By Decree No. 858 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 14, 1942, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism of the guard, Captain Mikhail Vasilyevich Avdeev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and medal " Golden Star".

An abandoned Soviet tracked tractor STZ-5-NATI exploded in the forest. Behind the tractor is an abandoned heavy tank KV-2, produced in May - June 1941, from one of the tank divisions of the 7th Mechanized Corps of the Western Front.

Filming location: Belarus, USSR
Time taken: summer 1941.

Squadron commander of the 788th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, Captain Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kozlov (1917 - 2005).

In June-September 1941 N.A. Kozlov is the deputy commander of the air squadron of the 162nd Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought on the Western (June 1941) and Bryansk (August-September 1941) fronts. Participated in defensive battles in Belarus and in the Bryansk direction. On September 24, 1941, a German Yu-88 bomber was shot down by a ramming attack from its MiG-3 fighter. During the ramming he was seriously wounded in the left leg and landed by parachute. Until December 1941, he was undergoing treatment in a hospital in the city of Ulyanovsk.

In February-July 1942 - deputy commander of the air squadron of the 439th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, in July-September 1942 - commander of the air squadron of the 788th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought as part of the Stalingrad air defense region (April-September 1942). Provided air cover for military installations in the cities of Stalingrad (now Volgograd), and participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. On May 25, 1942, near the city of Morozovsk (Rostov region), it made a second ramming attack, shooting down a German Ju-88 bomber. He made an emergency landing on his MiG-3 fighter and was slightly wounded. He spent several days in a hospital in Stalingrad.

In October 1942 - September 1943 - commander of the air squadron of the 910th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought as part of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk (October 1942 - June 1943) and Voronezh (June-July 1943) air defense regions, the Western Air Defense Front (July-September 1943). Provided air cover for railway junctions in the Voronezh region and participated in the Battle of Kursk.

For the courage and heroism shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 14, 1943, Captain Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kozlov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Since August 1943 - commander of the 907th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought as part of the Western (August 1943 - April 1944) and Northern (April-October 1944) air defense fronts. Provided air cover for front-line communications during the Battle of the Dnieper, the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine, the Korsun-Shevchenko, Belarusian and Berlin operations.

In total, during the war he made 520 combat missions on I-16, MiG-3, Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5 fighters, in 127 air battles he personally shot down 19 and 3 enemy aircraft as part of a group.

Soviet tanks KV-2 and T-34, stuck while crossing the Maidansky stream. Filming location: Lviv region, Ukraine. Time taken: 06/25/1941. Author: Alois Beck

A KV-2 heavy tank and a T-34 medium tank of the 1940 model with an L-11 cannon from, presumably, the 16th tank regiment of the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps of the Red Army, stuck and then knocked out on June 23, 1941 during time to cross the Maidansky stream. The tanks fought in the area of ​​the village of Stary Maidan, Radekhiv district, Lviv region of Ukraine.

German soldiers examine a Soviet KV-2 tank stuck in the Maidansky stream. Filming location: Lviv region, Ukraine. Filming time: 06/23-29/1941

A heavy tank KV-2 from, presumably, the 16th tank regiment of the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps of the Red Army, stuck and then knocked out on June 23, 1941 while crossing the Maidansky stream. The tanks fought in the area of ​​the village of Stary Maidan, Radekhiv district, Lviv region of Ukraine. It can be seen that the vehicle was under anti-tank artillery fire.

Flight commander of the 2nd Guards Aviation Regiment of the Northern Fleet Air Force, senior lieutenant Vladimir Pavlovich Pokrovsky (1918 - 1998).

V.P. Pokrovsky took part in the Great Patriotic War from June 1941, first as part of the 72nd mixed, from October 1941 - as part of the 78th fighter air regiment of the Northern Fleet, and then again in the 72nd mixed (then 2nd Guards mixed) air regiment. On December 26, 1942, while protecting an allied convoy, he shot down a German fighter, but was also shot down. He parachuted out and was rescued from the waters of the Kola Bay by Allied sailors. By May 1943, V.P. Pokrovsky made 350 combat missions, conducted 60 air battles, personally shot down 13 aircraft and in the group - 6 enemy aircraft.

For the exemplary performance of command assignments on the front of the fight against the German invaders and the courage and heroism shown, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 24, 1943, Guard Captain Pokrovsky Vladimir Pavlovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Since the summer of 1943 - commander of a training squadron at the course for commanders of the Naval Air Force units.

A German soldier poses on a T-34 tank that was shot down on the road in the Dubno area

Tank T-34 tank with L-11 cannon, manufactured in October 1940. Serial number 682-35. The tank belonged to the 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. Shot down in the Dubno area, possibly the south-eastern entrance to Dubno. According to the inscription on the right side, the tank was hit by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering regiment. Presumably, the tank was hit on June 29, 1941.

Soviet medium tank T-34 with L-11 cannon, manufactured in October 1940, knocked out near the road near the south-eastern entrance to Dubno. The serial number of the tank is 682-35. The vehicle belonged to the 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. According to the autograph on the right side, the tank was hit by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering regiment. The tank may have been hit on June 29, 1941. In the background, on the right side of the photo, you can see a damaged T-26 tank. From this angle, another damaged T-26 tank is visible. The same car from a different angle with the deceased tanker.

A Soviet T-34 tank knocked out on the road and a dead Soviet tankman next to it. Tank T-34 tank with L-11 cannon, manufactured in October 1940. Serial number 682-35. The tank belonged to the 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. Shot down in the Dubno area, possibly the south-eastern entrance to Dubno. According to the autograph on the starboard side, it was shot down by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Regiment. The tank may have been hit on June 29, 1941. In the middle of the road lies the driver's hatch.

Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot of the 3rd squadron of the 158th air defense fighter regiment, junior lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Zhukov (1917-1943), poses for a photograph in front of his I-16 fighter.

M.P. Zhukov had been part of the regiment since October 1940. He made his first combat mission on June 22, 1941. On June 29, 1941, in his third combat mission, he destroyed a Junkers Ju-88 bomber with a ramming attack.

He fought in the skies of Leningrad, accompanied transport planes, covered ports on Lake Ladoga and the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Was injured. At the end of 1941 he mastered the P-40E fighter.

January 12, 1943 M.P. Zhukov (by that time a senior lieutenant, flight commander of the 158th IAP) died in an air battle near the village of Moskovskaya Dubrovka. In total, he made 286 combat missions, conducted 66 air battles, shot down 9 enemy aircraft personally and 5 in a group.

Leningraders on 25th October Avenue (currently Nevsky Prospekt) near the boarded-up window of the Eliseevsky Store (officially called Grocery Store No. 1 Central). Author: Anatoly Garanin.

The boards contain “TASS Windows,” which first appeared in Leningrad in grocery store windows on June 24, 1941.

Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Alexey Nikolaevich Katrich (1917 - 2004).

A.N. Katrich graduated from the Chuguev Military Aviation School of Pilots in 1938. He served in the Air Force as a pilot in a fighter aviation regiment (in the Moscow Military District). Participant of the Great Patriotic War: in June 1941 - June 1942 - pilot, deputy commander and commander of the air squadron of the 27th Fighter Aviation Regiment (Moscow Air Defense Zone). Participated in the defense of Moscow, the protection of the city and rear communications of the Western Front from attacks by enemy bombers. On August 11, 1941, in an air battle, he shot down an enemy Dornier Do-215 reconnaissance aircraft with a ram at an altitude of 9,000 meters, after which he landed safely at his airfield.

For the courage and heroism shown in battles, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated October 28, 1941, Lieutenant Alexei Nikolaevich Katrich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

In June 1942 - October 1943, Katrich was the commander of the air squadron of the 12th Guards Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment. He fought as part of the Moscow and Western Air Defense Fronts. Participated in the defense of Moscow and rear communications of the Western Front from attacks by enemy bombers. In total, during the war he made 258 combat missions on MiG-3, Yak-1 and Yak-9 fighters, in 27 air battles he personally shot down 5 and as part of a group 9 enemy aircraft (M.Yu. Bykov in his research points to 5 personal and 7 group victories). In November 1943 - January 1946 - navigator of the 12th Guards Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, until 1944 he carried out combat duty in the air defense system of the city of Moscow.
Lieutenant-Commander Gurin commanded the destroyer Gremyashchiy on sea voyages escorting and guarding convoys, raiding operations on enemy ports and communications. Under his command, the destroyer completed 21 combat campaigns in 1941 and more than 30 in 1942. The destroyer's crew carried out 6 artillery fires on enemy troops on the coast, 4 laying minefields, participated in escorting 26 convoys, sank the German submarine "U-585" (March 30, 1942, Kildin Island area), together with a group of Soviet and British ships repelled an attack by a group of German destroyers on a convoy they were guarding (one enemy destroyer was sunk in this battle), and shot down 6 German aircraft.

In October 1942, A.I. Gurin was appointed commander of the 2nd division of the Northern Fleet destroyer brigade. From September 1944 to October 1945, he commanded the 1st destroyer division of the Northern Fleet squadron. During the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, he personally led the division during combat missions of artillery support for two naval landings and during the offensive of the forces of the Karelian Front along the coast of the Barents Sea. Captain 1st rank (1.09.1944).

Destroyer division under the command of Captain 1st Rank Gurin A.I. escorted allied convoys, carried out tasks to support the positions of our troops, shelled bases and searched for enemy ships and convoys. By May 1945, A.I. Gurin made over 100 different combat trips to sea and covered 79,370 nautical miles.

The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to captain 1st rank Gurin Anton Iosifovich was awarded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 8, 1945.

A group of Red Army soldiers who died on June 29-30, 1941 during a battle with units of the German 29th Infantry Division near the village of Ozernitsa, north of the Zelva-Slonim highway. Location: Slonim district, Belarus, USSR. Time of shooting: 06/29-30/1941.

In the background you can see a damaged T-34 tank from the 6th Mechanized Corps. In this battle, the headquarters of the 6th Mechanized Corps was ambushed.

Sergeant Gavriil Ivanovich Zalozny (born in 1901, right) at the Maxim machine gun. Time taken: 1941.

Gavriil Ivanovich Zalozny was drafted into the Red Army on June 26, 1941. He fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. On September 23, 1941, he was shell-shocked and captured. Released in February 1944 and enlisted in the 230th Reserve Regiment, from July 1944 - commander of the Maxim machine gun crew of the 12th Shock Assault Rifle Battalion of the 1st Shock Assault Rifle Regiment of the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. . Then he served in the 310th Guards Rifle Regiment.

Medical instructor of the 369th separate marine battalion, Chief Petty Officer E.I. Mikhailov in the Kerch region

Medical instructor of the 369th separate marine battalion of the Danube military flotilla, chief petty officer Ekaterina Illarionovna Mikhailova (Demina) (b. 1925).

In the Red Army since June 1941 (added two years to her 15 years). In the battles near Gzhatsk she was seriously wounded in the leg. She was treated in hospitals in the Urals and Baku. After recovery, from January 1942 she served on the military hospital ship "Red Moscow", which transported the wounded from Stalingrad to Krasnovodsk. There she was awarded the rank of chief petty officer and was awarded the “Excellence in the Navy” badge for her exemplary service. Among the volunteers, she was enrolled as a medical instructor in the 369th Separate Marine Battalion. The battalion was part of the Azov and then the Danube military flotillas. With this battalion, which later received the honorary name “Kerch Red Banner”, Mikhailova fought through the waters and shores of the Caucasus and Crimea, the Azov and Black Seas, the Dniester and the Danube, with a liberation mission - across the lands of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. Together with the soldiers of the battalion, she entered into battle, repelled enemy counterattacks, carried the wounded from the battlefield, and provided them with first aid. She was wounded three times.

On August 22, 1944, when crossing the Dniester estuary as part of the landing force, Chief Petty Officer E.I. Mikhailova was one of the first to reach the shore, provided first aid to seventeen seriously wounded sailors, suppressed the fire of a heavy machine gun, threw grenades at the bunker and destroyed over ten Nazis. December 4, 1944 E.I. Mikhailova, in the landing operation to capture the port of Prahovo and the Ilok fortress (Yugoslavia), being wounded, continued to provide medical assistance to the soldiers and, saving their lives, destroyed 5 enemy soldiers with a machine gun. After recovery, she returned to duty. As part of the 369th Marine Battalion, she fought for the Imperial Bridge in the Austrian capital of Vienna. Here she celebrated the Victory on May 9, 1945.

E.I. Mikhailova is the only woman to serve in Marine Corps intelligence. She was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, medals, including the Medal for Courage and the Florence Nightingale Medal.

To the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief Petty Officer E.I. Mikhailova was presented in August and December 1944, but the award did not take place.
By decree of the President of the USSR dated May 5, 1990, Demina (Mikhailova) Ekaterina Illarionovna was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 11608).

Radio speech by the Deputy Chairman of the Council
People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar
Foreign Affairs comrade. V.M. MOLOTOV
June 22, 1941.

CITIZENS AND CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade. Stalin instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities - Zhitomir, Kyiv - from their planes , Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory.

Construction of a Soviet anti-tank ditch in the Smolensk region.

This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire period of validity of this treaty the German government was never able to make a single claim against the USSR for the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the Germans fascist rulers.

Crashed Soviet planes. 1941

After the attack, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, at 5:30 a.m. made me, as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a statement on behalf of his government that the German government had decided to go to war against the USSR in connection with the concentration of Red Army units in the eastern German border.

German soldiers approach newly destroyed Soviet BT-2 tanks.

In response to this, on behalf of the Soviet government, I stated that until the last minute the German government did not make any claims against the Soviet government, that Germany attacked the USSR, despite the peace-loving position of the Soviet Union, and that thereby fascist Germany is the attacker side.

Destroyed Soviet tanks.

On behalf of the government of the Soviet Union, I must also state that at no point did our troops and our aviation allow the border to be violated, and therefore the statement made by Romanian radio this morning that Soviet aviation allegedly fired at Romanian airfields is a complete lie and provocation. The entire today’s declaration by Hitler, who is trying to retroactively concoct incriminating material about the Soviet Union’s non-compliance with the Soviet-German Pact, is the same lie and provocation.

Soviet girl volunteers are sent to the front. Summer 1941.

Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given our troops an order to repulse the bandit attack and expel German troops from the territory of our homeland. This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by the German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples .

June 22, 1941 near the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav. At that time, the San River was the border between German-occupied Poland and the USSR.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable confidence that our valiant army and navy and the brave falcons of Soviet aviation will honorably fulfill their duty to their homeland, to the Soviet people, and will deal a crushing blow to the aggressor.

The first Soviet prisoners of war, under the supervision of German soldiers, head west along the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav.

This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking, arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon’s campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who has announced a new campaign against our country. The Red Army and all our people will again wage a victorious patriotic war for their homeland, for honor, for freedom.

Nazi troops are fighting near the walls of the Brest Fortress 1941

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its firm confidence that the entire population of our country, all workers, peasants and intellectuals, men and women, will treat their duties and their work with due consciousness. Our entire people must now be united and united as never before. Each of us must demand from ourselves and from others discipline, organization, and dedication worthy of a true Soviet patriot in order to provide all the needs of the Red Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure victory over the enemy.

A machine-gun crew of German rangers fires from an MG-34 machine gun. Summer 1941, Army Group North. In the background, the crew is covering the StuG III self-propelled gun.

The government calls on you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade. Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.

Red Army soldiers on the battlefield near Kyiv 1941

Plan, Barbarossa,

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

National Defense Department
No. 33408/40. Sov. secret.

Fuhrer Headquarters

12/18/40

9 copies

9th copy
DIRECTIVE No. 21

The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the war against England is over. (Variant "Barbarossa").

Ground forces must use for this purpose all units at their disposal, with the exception of those necessary to protect the occupied territories from any surprises.

Colonel General Richthofen in a group of officers discussing the situation 1941

The task of the air force is to release such forces to support the ground forces in the eastern campaign so that ground operations can be counted on to be completed quickly while at the same time limiting the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft to a minimum. However, this concentration of Air Force efforts in the East must be limited by the requirement that all theaters of combat and areas where our military industry is located are reliably protected from enemy air raids and offensive actions against England and especially against its sea communications do not weaken at all.

Soldiers of a battery of naval heavy artillery under the command of Denninburg, participating in the defense of Odessa, at a gun in 1941.

The main efforts of the navy should also, of course, be concentrated against England during the eastern campaign.

If necessary, I will give the order for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces against the Soviet Union eight weeks before the scheduled start of operations.

Participants in the defense of the city of Odessa build barricades

Preparations that require a longer time, since they have not yet begun, should begin now and be completed by May 15, 1941.

It must be of decisive importance that our intentions to attack are not recognized.

Preparatory activities of the highest command authorities should be carried out based on the following basic provisions.
General idea

The main forces of the Russian ground forces located in Western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations through deep, rapid extension of tank wedges. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

German General Kruger in the vicinity of Leningrad

By rapid pursuit a line must be reached from which the Russian air force will be unable to carry out raids on Imperial German territory.

The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a barrier against Asian Russia along the common line Volga, Arkhangelsk. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial area remaining with the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.

During these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will thus be unable to continue the fight.

Effective actions of the Russian air force must be prevented by our powerful strikes at the very beginning of operations.

Workers of the Kirov plant go to the front

Allies and their missions
In the war against Soviet Russia on the flanks of our front, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, agree on and determine in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon entry into the war.
The task of Romania will be to support with selected troops the advance of the southern flank of the German troops, at least at the beginning of the operation, to pin down the enemy where German forces will not operate, and otherwise to carry out auxiliary service in the rear areas.
Finland must cover the concentration and deployment of a separate German northern group of forces (part of the 21st group), coming from Norway. The Finnish army will conduct combat operations together with these troops.

A battery fires at the enemy on the outskirts of Moscow

In addition, Finland will be responsible for the capture of the Hanko Peninsula.
It should be considered possible that by the beginning of the operation, Swedish railways and highways will be made available for use by the German group of forces intended for operations in the North.
Carrying out operations

A) Ground forces. (According to operational plans reported to me).

The theater of military operations is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern parts. The direction of the main attack should be prepared north of the Pripyat marshes. Two army groups should be concentrated here.

The southern of these groups, which is the center of the general front, has the task of attacking with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw area and north of it and splitting the enemy forces in Belarus. In this way, the prerequisites will be created for the rotation of powerful units of mobile troops to the north in order to, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic states. Only after completing this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should operations begin to capture Moscow, an important center of communications and military industry.

Soviet prisoners of war in a transit camp

And only the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Russian resistance could justify the formulation and implementation of these two tasks simultaneously.

The most important task of the 21st Group also during the Eastern Campaign remains the defense of Norway.

The forces available in addition to this (the mountain corps) should be used in the North primarily for the defense of the Petsamo region and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route. Then these forces must, together with Finnish troops, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to disrupt the supply of the Murmansk region via land communications.

Whether such an operation will be carried out by German troops (2-3 divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it depends on Sweden’s willingness to put its railways at our disposal for transporting troops.

Soviet prisoners of war harnessed to a plow (From trophy photographs confiscated from captured and killed Wehrmacht soldiers)

The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked with pinning down as much as possible in accordance with the advance of the German northern flank by attacking to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga.

a larger number of Russian troops, as well as capture the Hanko Peninsula.

The army group operating south of the Pripyat Marshes must, through concentric attacks, with its main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops located in Ukraine, even before the latter reach the Dnieper.

A German general inspects a captured Soviet anti-tank gun

For this purpose, the main blow is delivered from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv. At the same time, troops located in Romania cross the river. The rod is in the lower reaches and carries out deep coverage of the enemy. The Romanian army will have the task of shackling the Russian forces located inside the pincers being formed.

At the end of the battles to the south and north of the Pripyat swamps, during the pursuit the following tasks should be ensured:

In the south - timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk basin.

A group of German soldiers near a pile of Soviet canned food captured as a trophy

In the north - quickly reach Moscow. The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction.

B) Air Force. Their task will be to, as far as possible, impede and reduce the effectiveness of counteraction by the Russian air force and support the ground forces in their operations in decisive directions.

This will be necessary primarily on the front of the central army group and on the main direction of the southern army group.

Russian railways and communications routes, depending on their importance for the operation, should be cut or disabled through the capture of important objects closest to the combat area (river crossings) by bold actions of airborne troops.

German machine gunners and machine gunner. Behind the back of the second crew number is a replaceable barrel in a case. Narva, 1941

In order to concentrate all forces to fight against enemy aircraft and to directly support ground forces, raids on military industrial facilities should not be carried out during the operation. Such raids, and primarily against the Urals, will become the order of the day only after the completion of maneuver operations.

B) Navy. In the war against Soviet Russia, he will have the task, while ensuring the defense of his coast, to prevent the enemy’s navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. Considering that after reaching Leningrad, the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless position, major naval operations should be avoided until this point.

Destroyed Soviet airfield. District of Minsk.

After the neutralization of the Russian fleet, the task will be to ensure complete freedom of maritime communications in the Baltic Sea, in particular the supply by sea of ​​the northern flank of the ground forces (mine sweeping).
All orders that will be given by the Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly proceed from the fact that we are talking about precautionary measures in case Russia changes its present position towards us.

Column of German troops. Ukraine, July 1941.

The number of officers involved in initial preparations should be as limited as possible. The remaining employees, whose involvement is necessary, should be involved in the work as late as possible and become familiar only with those particular aspects of training that are necessary for the performance of official duties of each of them individually.

Otherwise, there is a danger of serious political and military complications arising as a result of the disclosure of our preparations, the dates of which have not yet been set.
I expect oral reports from the Commanders-in-Chief on their future intentions based on this directive.

The dead Soviet soldiers, as well as civilians - women and children. Bodies dumped in a roadside ditch like household trash; Dense columns of German troops are calmly moving past along the road.

Report to me about the planned preparatory activities of all types of armed forces and the progress of their implementation through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Signed: Hitler

Correct: captain (signature)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Operations management headquarters.
National Defense Division (Quartermaster IV)
No. 44125/41. Sov. secret. Fuhrer Headquarters
13.3.41
Base. Directive of the headquarters of the operational leadership (country defense department/1) No. 33408/40 dated 12/18/40 Sov. secret.

Refugees in the Pskov region.

TROOPS CONCENTRATION DIRECTIVE

(plan "Barbarossa")
General tasks.

Should Russia change her present attitude towards Germany, extensive preparatory measures should be taken as a precaution to enable Soviet Russia to be defeated in a short-lived campaign before the war against England is over.

German soldiers in a street battle in the Baltic states.

Operations must be carried out in such a way that, through a deep penetration of tank troops, the entire mass of Russian troops located in Western Russia is destroyed.

At the same time, it is necessary to prevent the possibility of the retreat of combat-ready Russian troops into the vast interior regions of the country.
Enemy position.

Dead Soviet tank crews and tank landing soldiers at the gates of the border outpost. Tank – T-26.

It should be considered most likely that the Russians, using field fortifications reinforced in certain areas on the new and old state borders, as well as numerous water barriers convenient for defense, will enter the battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. The Russian command will attach particular importance to maintaining its air and naval bases in the Baltic provinces for as long as possible and maintaining its southern flank adjacent to the Black Sea through the use of large forces.

If operations south and north of the Pripyat marshes develop unfavorably, the Russians will try to stop the German offensive along the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers.

German collection point for Soviet captured equipment and weapons. On the left are Soviet 45mm anti-tank guns, then a large number of Maxim heavy machine guns and DP-27 light machine guns, on the right are 82mm mortars. Summer 1941.

Already when eliminating German breakthroughs, as well as during possible attempts to withdraw endangered troops to the Dnieper and Western Dvina line, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions by large Russian formations using tanks.

The enemy grouping is given in detail in Appendix Za-g and the certificate “Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” dated January 1, 1941.
The idea.

Damaged T-26.

The first intention of the main command of the ground forces, in accordance with the above task, is to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy the disunited groups enemy troops.

South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group "South" under the command of Field Marshal Rundstedt, using a swift strike from powerful tank formations from the Lublin region, cuts off Soviet troops located in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, seizes crossings across the river. The Dnieper is in the Kyiv region and to the south of it and thus provides freedom of maneuver to solve subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or to carry out new tasks in the south of Russia.

Tank Pz.Kpfw.38(t) from the German 7th Panzer Division on the march. A burning Soviet tank is visible on the left.

North of the Pripyat marshes Army Group Center advances under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having brought powerful tank formations into battle, it makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and, together with Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, destroys the Soviet troops located in the Baltic states. Then the troops of Army Group North and the mobile forces of Army Group Center, together with the Finnish army and German troops sent from Norway for this purpose, finally deprive the enemy of the last defensive capabilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured to carry out subsequent tasks in cooperation with German troops advancing in southern Russia.

A German column passes an abandoned Soviet artillery park.

In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north disappears and the question of an immediate attack on Moscow may arise.

The start of the offensive will be given with a single order along the entire front from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea (day “B”, time - “U”).

A damaged German armored personnel carrier in the Smolensk region. August 1941

The basis for conducting combat operations in this operation can be the principles that proved themselves in the Polish campaign. At the same time, however, it should be taken into account that, along with concentrating forces on the directions of the main attacks, it is necessary to attack the enemy also on other sectors of the front.

Only in this way will it be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of combat-ready enemy forces and destroy them west of the Dnieper-Zap line. Dvina To an even greater extent than hitherto, one should expect the impact of enemy aircraft on ground forces, especially since the German air forces will not be fully involved in operations against Russia. Troops must also be prepared for the possibility that the enemy may use chemical agents.
Tasks of army groups and armies:

The German light tank Pz.Kpfw destroyed by Soviet artillery. II Ausf. C.

A) Army Group South advances with its reinforced left flank in the general direction of Kyiv, with mobile units ahead. The general task is to destroy Soviet troops in Galicia and Western Ukraine further west of the river. Dnieper and timely capture crossings on the Dnieper in the Kyiv area and to the south, thereby creating the preconditions for continuing operations east of the Dnieper. The offensive should be prepared and carried out in such a way that mobile troops were concentrated for a strike from the Lublin area in the direction of Kyiv.

Soviet refugees walk past an abandoned BT-7A tank.

In accordance with this general task, the army and tank group, guided by direct instructions from the command of Army Group South, must ensure the implementation of the following tasks:

The 11th Army provides cover for Romanian territory against Soviet invasion, keeping in mind Romania's vital importance to the war effort. During the offensive of the troops of Army Group South, the 11th Army pins down the enemy forces opposing it, creating the false impression of a strategic deployment of large forces, and, as the further situation develops, by delivering a number of strikes in cooperation with aviation against the retreating enemy troops, it prevents the organized withdrawal of the Soviet troops for the Dniester.

The takeoff of German Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers from a field airfield in the USSR.

The 1st Tank Group, in cooperation with the troops of the 17th and 6th armies, breaks through the defenses of enemy troops concentrated near the border between Rava-Russkaya and Kovel and, moving through Berdichev, Zhitomir, promptly reaches the river. Dnieper in the Kyiv region and to the south. Subsequently, without wasting time, according to the instructions of the command of Army Group "South", it continues its offensive along the Dnieper in a south-eastern direction in order to prevent withdrawal across the river. Dnieper enemy group operating in Western Ukraine, and destroy it with a blow from the rear.

German infantry passes by broken Soviet vehicles.

The 17th Army breaks through enemy defenses on the border northwest of Lvov. Quickly advancing with her strong left flank, she pushes the enemy back in a southeast direction and destroys him. Subsequently, this army, using the successful advance of the troops of the tank group, immediately enters the Vinnitsa, Berdichev region and, depending on the situation, continues the offensive in a southern or southeastern direction.

Red Army soldiers surrender to SS soldiers.

The 6th Army, in cooperation with formations of the 1st Tank Group, breaks through the enemy front in the area of ​​​​the city of Lutsk and, covering the northern flank of the army group from possible attacks from the Pripyat swamps, if possible, with its main forces, with maximum speed, follows to Zhitomir troops of the tank group. The army troops must be ready, upon instructions from the command of the army group, to turn their main forces to the southeast, west of the river. Dnieper, in order to, in cooperation with the tank group, prevent the retreat of the enemy group operating in Western Ukraine beyond the Dnieper and destroy it.

A rally at the Leningrad Kirov plant about the beginning of the war.

b) Army Group Center, concentrating its main forces on the flanks, splits the enemy forces in Belarus. Mobile formations advancing south and north of Minsk timely connect in the Smolensk region and thus create the preconditions for the interaction of large forces of mobile forces with the troops of Army Group North in order to destroy enemy forces located in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region.

As part of this task, according to the instructions of the command of Army Group Center, tank groups and armies perform the following tasks:

Battle on the streets of the city of Nemirov (Lvov region, Ukraine) on June 24, 1941, destroyed German SIG 33 guns of the 13th company of the 211th infantry regiment of the 71st infantry division are visible in the background.

The 2nd Tank Group, interacting with the 4th Army, breaks through enemy border fortifications in the Kobrin area and to the north and, quickly advancing to Slutsk and Minsk, in cooperation with the 3rd Tank Group advancing to the area north of Minsk, creates the preconditions for destruction enemy troops located between Bialystok and Minsk. Its further task: in close cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Group, to capture the terrain in the Smolensk region and south of it as quickly as possible, to prevent the concentration of enemy forces in the upper reaches of the Dnieper, thereby preserving Army Group Center freedom of action to carry out subsequent tasks.

Artillerymen of the 29th motorized division of the Wehrmacht from an ambush shot Soviet tanks on the side with a 50-mm PaK 38 cannon. The closest one, on the left, is the T-34 tank. Belarus, 1941.

The 3rd Tank Group, in cooperation with the 9th Army, breaks through enemy border fortifications north of Grodno, rapidly advances to the area north of Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Tank Group advancing from the southwest towards Minsk, creates the preconditions for the destruction of enemy forces located between Bialystok and Minsk. The subsequent task of the 3rd Panzer Group: working closely with the 2nd Panzer Group, to quickly reach the Vitebsk area and further north, to prevent the concentration of enemy forces in the upper Dvina area, thereby ensuring the army group freedom of action in carrying out subsequent tasks.

The first day of the war in Przemysl (today the Polish city of Przemysl) and the first invaders killed on Soviet soil (soldiers of the 101st Light Infantry Division). The city was occupied by German troops on June 22, but was liberated the next morning by Red Army units and border guards and held until June 27.

The 4th Army, delivering the main blow on both sides of Brest-Litovsk, crosses the river. Zap. Bug and thereby opens the way for the 2nd Tank Group to Minsk. The main forces are developing an offensive across the river. Shara at Slonim and further south, using the success of tank groups, in cooperation with the 9th Army, destroys enemy troops located between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, this army follows the 2nd Tank Group, covering its left flank from the Pripyat swamps, and captures the crossing of the river. Berezina between Bobruisk and Berezino and crosses the river. The Dnieper near Mogilev and further north.

Soldiers and officers of the Red Army surrender to German tank crews.

The 9th Army, in cooperation with the 3rd Tank Group, delivers the main blow with its northern wing to the enemy group located west and north of Grodno, using the success of the tank groups, rapidly advances in the direction of Lida, Vilnius and destroys the enemy forces together with the 4th Army, located between Bialystok and Minsk. Later, following the 3rd Panzer Group, it reaches the river. Zap. Dvina near Polotsk and southeast of it.

German soldiers next to a burning Soviet village.

c) Army Group North has the task of destroying enemy forces operating in the Baltic states and capturing ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, depriving the Russian fleet of its bases. Issues of joint actions with powerful mobile forces advancing on Smolensk and subordinate to Army Group Center will be clarified in a timely manner and brought to the attention of the especially high command of the ground forces.

In accordance with this task, Army Group "North" breaks through the enemy's front and, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dvinsk, advances as quickly as possible with its reinforced right flank, throwing mobile troops forward to cross the river. Zap. Dvina, goes to the area northeast of Opochka in order to prevent the retreat of combat-ready Russian forces from the Baltic states to the east and create the preconditions for further successful advance to Leningrad.

Residents of Leningrad at the display window of LenTASS “Latest News” (Sotsialisticheskaya street, building 14 - “Pravda” printing house).

As part of this task, at the direction of the command of Army Group North, the 4th Panzer Group and armies perform the following tasks:

The 4th Tank Group, together with the 16th and 18th armies, breaks through the enemy front between the lake. Vishtynetskoye and dear Tilsit, Siauliai, are moving towards the West. Dvina to the Dvinsk region and further south and seizes a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina Subsequently, the 4th Panzer Group reaches the area northeast of Opochka as quickly as possible in order from here, depending on the situation, to continue the offensive in a northeastern or northern direction.

German equipment on the march near the city of Yartsevo, Smolensk region.

The 16th Army, in cooperation with the 4th Panzer Group, breaks through the front of the opposing enemy and, delivering the main blow on both sides of the Ebenrode-Kaunas road, with the rapid advance of its strong right flank behind the tank corps, reaches the northern bank of the river as quickly as possible. Zap. Dvina near Dvinsk and south of it. Subsequently, this army, following the 4th Panzer Group, quickly reaches the Opochka area.

Soviet tanks abandoned after the battles near Dubno, July 1941. In the background is a T-35 (model 1938). Two white stripes on the turret are the tactical insignia of the 67th Tank Regiment of the 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps KOVO. In the foreground is a light tank T-26 (model 1939) - from the same division. On June 22, 1941, the division had 7 KV, 38 T-35, 238 T-26 and 25 BT.

The 18th Army breaks through the front of the opposing enemy and, delivering the main blow along the Tilsit, Riga road and to the east, quickly crosses the river with its main forces. Zap. The Dvina near Plavinas and to the south, cuts off enemy units located southwest of Riga and destroys them. Subsequently, quickly moving towards the Pskov-Ostrov line, it prevents the withdrawal of Russian troops to the area south of Lake Peipus and, at the direction of the command of Army Group North, in cooperation with tanks in the area north of Lake Peipsi, clears the territory of Estonia from the enemy.

Curious German soldiers inspect a damaged Soviet light tank BT-7. 1941 June.

On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of Nazi Germany, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and carried out bombing airstrikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

The Great Patriotic War began. They were waiting for her, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin’s distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates for the start of the war were given, for example May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to a later date. There is another factor that is extremely rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. Thus, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the main attack directed in an area where this was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like misinformation, so it was on this day that the attack was least expected.
And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic states this date is considered positive, giving “hope for liberation.”

Russia

§4. Invasion of the USSR. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War
At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, relied mainly on the surprise attack factor, the tactics of blitzkrieg (“lightning war”). The defeat of the USSR was planned within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
In the first days of the war, the German army caused serious damage to the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic states. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July 5 million people had been drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps that had formed at the front.

V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. 9th grade. Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, Ventana-Graf Publishing House, 2013.

Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
While fulfilling the grandiose tasks of Stalin's third five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government did not for a minute forget about the possibility of a new "attack by the imperialists on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 in his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try to carry out a military attack on the USSR on occasion.”
Comrade Stalin demanded strengthening the defense capability of our country. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, and Osoaviakhim in every possible way. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies can take us by surprise...”
Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, forced them to more vigilantly monitor the machinations of their enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were seeking to unleash a new bloody war, with the help of which they hoped to conquer world domination. Hitler declared the Germans to be the “superior race”, and all other peoples to be inferior, inferior races. The Nazis treated the Slavic peoples with particular hatred and, first of all, the great Russian people, who more than once in their history fought against the German aggressors.
The Nazis based their plan on the plan for a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and a rapid advance deep into Russia, right up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
The monstrous war machine of the Hitlerite imperialists began its movement in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.

Textbook “History of the USSR”, 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Fokht, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

Austria, Germany

Chapter “From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat”
After careful preparation that lasted many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany began a “war of total annihilation” against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the German Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called Barbarossa. It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of the trained German military machine, Soviet troops would not be able to provide worthy resistance. Within a few months, the Nazi command seriously expected to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would completely demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, within a few weeks the Nazis were driven back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

Textbook “History” for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

Holt McDougal. The World History.
For Senior High School, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

Hitler began planning an attack on his ally the USSR in the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeastern Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a bridgehead in Southeastern Europe for an attack on the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
In preparation for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threat of force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis powers. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, resisted. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell 11 days later. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early on the morning of June 22, 1941, the roar of German tanks and the drone of airplanes signaled the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not prepared for this attack. Although he had the largest army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans were 500 miles (804.67 kilometers) inside the Soviet Union. Retreating, Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the enemy's path. The Russians used this scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

Section 7. World War II
The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. The German army, which numbered about three million soldiers, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - towards Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - towards Moscow and in the south - towards Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans besieged Leningrad and Sevastopol and came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main goal of the Nazis - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - was never realized. Vast spaces and the early Russian winter, with fierce resistance from Soviet troops and ordinary residents of the country, thwarted the German plan for a lightning war. At the beginning of December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and pushed back enemy troops 200 kilometers from Moscow.

History textbook for the 8th grade of primary school (Klett publishing house, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

Never before had our people reacted to a German invasion except with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov, in a trembling voice, reported the German attack, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
Russian soldiers disliked the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and passionate about music; laughter and playing musical instruments could be heard from the places where they gathered.

Lauri Vakhtre. Textbook “Turning moments in Estonian history.”

Bulgaria

Chapter 2. Globalization of the conflict (1941–1942)
Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Having begun the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of “living space”, proclaimed in the book “My Struggle” (“Mein Kampf”). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet Pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating “Jewish Marxists.”
However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shocked by the surprise attack, drained of blood by Stalin's repressions and ill-prepared, the Soviet army was quickly driven back. In a few weeks, German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht was unable to defeat the enemy in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership developed plans to attack the USSR and develop the territory and use its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was supposed to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

Plan for a “lightning war” against the USSR
The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against “Asian Russia” by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary participation in the Red Army became widespread. The people's militia became widespread. In the front-line zone, fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and material assets began from territories threatened by occupation.
The military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The headquarters was headed by J. Stalin. Italy
June 22, 1941
Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for graduating 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for 11th grade of high school "Our New History", Dar Aun Publishing House, 2008.
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. A broad front opened in eastern Europe. Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the end of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 took an ambiguous position of condemning “opposing imperialisms,” revised it in favor of an alliance with democracy and the fight against fascism.
The fact that the USSR represented the main target of Hitler’s expansionist intentions was not a mystery to anyone, including the Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Great Britain. So when the German offensive (codenamed Barbarossa) began on June 22, 1941, along a 1,600-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, a lack of preparedness reinforced by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red Army of the army of its best military leaders, initially made the task of the aggressor easier.
The offensive, which also included the Italian expeditionary force, which was sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in a crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltic states, in the south through Ukraine, with the aim of reaching the oil regions of the Caucasus .

Today's topic of the lecture is the battle in the sky on June 22, 1941, the confrontation between the Red Army and the Luftwaffe. Today we will talk both directly about the battle and about the background.

I would like to note that in Soviet times little attention was paid to this issue in the literature. There were no special publications on this topic at all, and in some studies that covered the development of the Soviet armed forces and in particular the Air Force, several paragraphs or, at best, a chapter were devoted to this problem.

Everything led to the fact that by the beginning of the 90s, stereotypes had formed, a very definite picture of that day and previous events, which can be briefly characterized by the following points: the defeat of the Red Army Air Force was due to the surprise of the German attack, as a rule, it was always added that there were More than 60 Soviet airfields were attacked and over 1,200 aircraft were destroyed. Almost all publications added that the Luftwaffe had a numerical superiority over the Soviet Air Force and that most of the Soviet aircraft were outdated or technically faulty. There were around 2 thousand aircraft of new types, Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2. The Luftwaffe, together with its allies, had about 5 thousand aircraft in all publications, thus they were superior to the Red Army Air Force technically and numerically.

This information wandered from book to book, and there were few variations. Basically, people who were interested in this topic could glean information from the memories of eyewitnesses or participants. By the beginning of the 90s, certain myths had developed. This had negative consequences: in connection with the so-called. “freedom of speech” gave rise to pseudo-theories that tried to answer who was to blame. It turned out that in fact, either the generals betrayed and this catastrophe occurred, or the Soviet soldiers did not intend to fight. In particular, such a theory was put forward by the well-known Mark Solonin, who devoted several books to this topic. In them, he tries to prove that supposedly no battle took place in the air, and that the Russian pilots simply fled, abandoned their equipment and retreated far to the east. This started already in the early 2000s. The first publication was called: “Where did Stalin’s falcons fly away?” Briefly, I would like to dispel doubts: they fought the enemy as best they could, using all the forces and means that were available at that moment, simply the lack of documentary material made it possible for such people to operate with unverified facts.

The first thing that Solonin is wrong about is that he starts from the wrong tasks. He could not even determine the composition of the Soviet Air Force grouping on June 22 in the Western border districts, since at that time he did not have information about the real composition and deployment of the Air Force in the western districts. And then, using operational reports, operational documentation, combat reports, he draws incorrect conclusions. He believes that if, say, a regiment had 50 aircraft, and the next day the report says that there are 20 aircraft left, and in terms of losses in the same operational report it says 10 aircraft, against this background he says: “And where what about the remaining cars?" And he expresses some theses that are completely untrue, because operational reports were very different from reports of losses, and often what was written in the morning operational report, for example, on June 22, 1941, was completely inconsistent with what later , a few days later was given to higher command as losses. That is, the person initially set the wrong direction, then “put” under his version certain documents that do not correspond to the research format. Roughly speaking, he starts talking about quantity, and in the end he operates with operational documents that had nothing to do with this quantity. Thus, a person makes incomprehensible conclusions and puts forward crazy theories. The strangest thing is that this is picked up by many on the Internet, and some kind of conspiracy theory practically begins.

How did things really go?

The condition of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of World War II, by September 1, 1939, and by June 22, 1941, was far from optimal. Why? There were quite objective reasons. Firstly, the very geography of our country played against the Red Army, which implied the presence of a very powerful group in the Far East, including the air force, and in Transcaucasia. The forces that the Soviet Union should have had at that time could not be transferred quickly. Let's say, aviation from Central Russia to the Far East. There wasn’t even a flight route, so the plane had to first be disassembled and transported in trains. This took a lot of time, so the Soviet leadership was forced to maintain very powerful groups in the Far East and Transcaucasia. That is, initially the Soviet Union needed to have much more strength in peacetime, accordingly, to produce more aircraft, graduate more pilots, spend more resources, fuel, engine hours, and so on.

Second aspect: The Soviet Union only began industrialization in the early 20s. To develop such an industry as aircraft manufacturing in 10–15 years is a very difficult task, considering that neither production nor development took place in Tsarist Russia. Purchased engines and aircraft structures were used. Although there were outstanding designers, Sikorsky is the same, but basically what was used at the front was Allied equipment, which, at best, was produced under license. In general, it was not possible to overcome the problem of creating our own high-quality aircraft industry and equipment at the beginning of World War II.

Map of the construction of operational airfields

A striking example: by September 1, the Luftwaffe received several engines with power above 1000 hp. Unfortunately, the Red Army Air Force did not have such equipment and lagged behind for almost an entire period.

Thus, in technical terms, Soviet aircraft were inferior to German ones. Another reason for this was the production of aluminum, which in the USSR was 3–4 times behind that of Germany. Accordingly, the Germans could afford to build all-metal aircraft from duralumin, which, naturally, are lighter, but the USSR was forced to build aircraft of mixed designs, heavier, which, in the presence of weak engines, created a difficult situation.

The second issue, which, as a rule, has not been and is not covered, is the organizational and mobilization activities carried out from 1938 until the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union, as is known, although it did not fully enter the war on September 1, began preparations long ago. There was a “bias” towards quantitative parameters. There were reasons for this, including the territory. We took the path of more aircraft, pilots, formations, parts, at the expense of quality. The training of flight personnel, which was already not up to par in the 30s, completely fell to an unacceptable minimum in the 38–40s, and graduating pilots, as a rule, the most they could master on a combat aircraft was takeoff and landing . There were often cases when graduating cadets had literally 20–30 flights on combat aircraft. They practically couldn’t even take off and land. At the beginning of 1939, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 aviation regiments, in 1940 they added another 100, and in 1941 they began to form another 100 regiments. Thus, in terms of quantitative characteristics, the Red Army Air Force had a perfect armada - 350 aviation regiments, more than 20 thousand combat aircraft, 23 thousand pilots in combat units, plus 7 thousand instructor pilots in military schools and 34 thousand simultaneously trained cadets. With such indicators there was no talk of any quality of preparation. This is another reason that the events were quite tragic.

In many countries, including Japan, the opposite trend was observed. They paid too much attention to the quality of pilot training and, as a result, lost a lot in numbers. When in 1942-44 the Americans knocked out the bulk of their experienced pilots - probably everyone knows this story - it turned out that the Japanese simply did not have the personnel. The bias in both directions is not very good, and only the Americans managed to find a middle ground, and only due to the fact that they had the richest country. They had the opportunity to train good pilots in huge quantities and at the same time produce excellent aircraft and engines.

Due to the so-called organizational and mobilization measures, the composition of the personnel units was greatly “liquified.” Even those units that were formed in the 30s and reorganized into regiments in 1938, from them throughout the 40-41 years, experienced pilots and commanders were regularly taken and sent as command staff to the newly formed units. This led to negative consequences, because the personnel of the personnel units was greatly weakened.

Let's move on to preparing for war. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing to conduct combat operations in the air quite decisively. Both sides intended to carry out the first operations specifically to gain air supremacy and were preparing to act on airfields first. However, the approaches differed. The German Air Force took a more detailed approach to this issue. An important factor here was that the Germans held fewer organizational events, formed fewer units, retaining the pre-war personnel in a very good composition. Of course, they had losses in the campaign in the West, the campaign of 1940, but overall the core remained. If the Germans had 23 fighter groups at the beginning of World War II, then on June 22 they had about 40 fighter groups, i.e. The composition has increased, but not much. And the Soviet Air Force, which had 55 fighter regiments on September 1, 1939, already had about 150 by 1941, and the number of personnel and equipment in them was meant to be greater than that of the Luftwaffe. The quality of training suffered because of this, but there were other reasons related to intelligence activities. The Germans at one time created a powerful reconnaissance aviation even before the war, which included units at all levels of subordination, starting from the Wehrmacht high command, which had its eyes in the form of a specialized unit, or rather, a formation, the Rovel chief group, which included both reconnaissance aviation units , as well as infrastructure, laboratories, airfields, which allowed them to conduct reconnaissance at the highest level. The Germans began preparing for military operations against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbarossa plan, which was adopted in December 1940; accordingly, the Germans began preparations from the beginning of January. The planes were specially built, or rather, converted from existing models: high-altitude engines were installed on them, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, and all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several Yu-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins, which allowed them to operate from altitudes of 12–13 km. At that time, this was the maximum altitude for interceptors, and it was difficult to use interceptor fighters effectively. Plus, the fact that there was no radar field over the Soviet-German border played a role. The Soviet Union had several radar stations, but they were all located in the area of ​​Leningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were completely unpunished. You can look at a map, a real map from TsAMO, which gives an idea of ​​the activities of German reconnaissance aircraft.

This is the region of East Prussia and the Baltic states. One of the squadrons, based in the Königsberg area, the 2nd squadron of the Rovel Obergruppe, carried out reconnaissance flights along the route: they took off from the Seerappen airfield along Königsberg, further over the Baltic Sea, arrived approximately in the Libau region, further in the Riga region, made reconnaissance flights over the entire territory of the Baltic States, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest region, landed at an airfield in the Warsaw region, refueled and carried out a return reconnaissance flight along the same route in the opposite direction. Soviet VNSO posts, that is, observation and detection, very rarely recorded these flights because they were carried out at high altitude. Unfortunately, we do not know how many such flights were carried out. Soviet data says 200 flights, but in reality there were many more. There is no German data, but there is factual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at one time were able to photograph almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, and troop concentrations. For example, an aerial photograph taken from a German reconnaissance aircraft on April 10, 1941.

Aerial photography. Kaunas, April 10, 1941

It shows Kaunas, the famous Kaunas Fortress, the airfield, more precisely, the southern part of the airfield, where the 15th Fighter Regiment of the 8th Mixed Division was based. Hangars and aircraft parking areas are visible. The detail in these images was amazing, you can see everything, including every plane. The Luftwaffe crews for whom such tablets were being prepared had the opportunity to familiarize themselves in detail with future targets. This activity was carried out on a daily basis, without stopping almost until June 22, before the invasion, and we have some opportunities in retrospect to see how the situation changed.

For example, here is a later photo taken on June 9, the entire Kaunas airfield is already visible, including what we saw in the previous photo - the hangars of the 15th IAP, the planes are standing in three rows in front of the hangars, you can even now count each plane. In the northern part of the airfield of the 31st IAP, you can count all the planes and plan approaches for bombing on both sides.

Aerial photography. June 9, 1941

What could the Red Army oppose in terms of intelligence? Many have noticed that recently there have been a number of publications devoted to the intelligence activities of various structures. She, of course, was very important, but, unfortunately, she did not provide materials similar to the German ones. Here, by the way, is a Yu-86 aircraft with a pressurized cabin, civilian registration plates are visible. This is the only vehicle lost during these reconnaissance flights. A unique photo. The crew landed in the Rivne area - their engines failed. The Germans managed to blow up the plane before they were captured, but, nevertheless, Soviet specialists were able to extract several remnants of photographic equipment, including film where it was clear that the Germans were photographing railway crossings in the Korosten area.

Downed Yu-86

The Soviet Air Force could rely on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 1930s, because permission for intelligence activities was not received until at least the beginning of June. There are several notes written by the heads of the Red Army Air Force department - first Rychagov, then Zhigarev, who asked Timoshenko and Stalin to begin reconnaissance over German territory, but until mid-June there was no such decision. Soviet pilots were forced to rely on less current data that was collected back in the 30s. For some objects they were of quite good quality - for example, the plan of Königsberg, which is quite good, there are map materials, even some photographic materials on which the Devau airfield is marked. But the bulk of the data was represented by approximately these diagrams, which at best contained target coordinates, a small description and a simple diagram, which, of course, can be used as a visual aid, but it was almost impossible to find the airfield using it.

Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations often at random. The difference in intelligence between the Germans and the Red Army Air Force is roughly understandable. According to the plans (we do not take into account political questions about who was going to attack first and who was not), the Soviet cover plans for the Red Army were to act aggressively, delivering a series of attacks on German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of up-to-date intelligence information, some of the attacks, even according to these plans, would have been carried out on empty airfields where there were no combat units, and vice versa, those airfields where combat units were located, according to the plan, should not have been attacked .

The Germans, accordingly, could adjust their plans until June 22 and have up-to-date information, seeing the movements of the Red Army Air Force as if online. And when some comrades doubt that the Germans had such successes on June 22, this is quite strange. Because, having information about where it was necessary to strike, the Germans did not even need to expend effort for this, only selecting small groups of aircraft that carried out precise strikes.

The aspect of technical preparation for combat operations is interesting. The Luftwaffe carried out research after the Polish and French events and especially during the “Battle of Britain.” Tactics of action against enemy airfields were developed, which included both tactical techniques and the use of specialized ammunition. A range of weapons was developed for the purpose, including fragmentation bombs, which were supposed to become know-how, an effective method of destroying aircraft at airfields. This is a small SD-2 bomb, weighing 2.5 kg, the smallest bomb at that time intended for combat. Next came the SD-10 in the nomenclature, then the SD-50 fragmentation bomb, and the last, SD-250, this is already a very heavy bomb, but it was rarely used. The main bombs that were used were SD-2 and SD-50.

Aviation bombs SD-2 and SD-50

What was their advantage? German planes received holders for these bombs, which made it possible to hang a very large number of them. Let's say that an ordinary Messerschmitt fighter had the ability to hang 96 such bombs. Despite the fact that the bomb was small at first glance, it had an effectiveness equal to an 82-mm mine, that is, very serious: hitting an aircraft almost always disabled it. In addition, some of this ammunition was clocked, making it an even greater problem for airfields. They could explode an hour or two after they were dropped.

This is what a plane from the second group of the 27th Fighter Squadron, equipped with bombs, looked like in the field.

A real photo of June 1941 in the Suwałki area. SD-2 suspensions for the BF-110 heavy fighter, it has 48 bombs under each wing, the total load is 96 bombs. They also practiced hanging 4 SD-50 bombs, which, in principle, is also effective. Please note that, for example, a typical SB, the main bomber in the Red Army Air Force by 1941, as a rule, carried a load of only 6 FAB-100 bombs, that is, the Mi-109 fighter was actually equivalent to the SB.

An interesting video of the attack with SD-2 bombs is that it shows the area of ​​airfields that could have been covered with them. This is the first footage, this is an SD-50 bombing, by the way. But SD-2 is being bombed. That is, even a small group of German fighters equipped with such bombs could with a high degree of confidence guarantee the destruction of materiel that was not covered.

German bombers were also prepared specifically for operations against airfields. They, as a rule, carried (Junkers-88 and Dornier-17) 360 of these bombs, which is what we just saw. A group of three aircraft could drop 1000 of these bombs. In addition, even larger ammunition was used, mainly SD-50 bombs. In the range of the German Ju-88 and Dornier-17 bombers, 20 such bombs could be suspended without overload, and the Heinkel-111 bomber could suspend 32 such bombs without overload. That is, the attack of the Junkers-88 flight was equivalent to an attack by an SB group of 9 aircraft.

Accordingly, the Heinkel-111 link could drop almost 100 such bombs, and this is equivalent to the actions of a squadron of DB-3 aircraft, into which 10 “hundred parts” were suspended. In addition, all German fighters at that time were already armed with cannons, two guns or one each, if we talk about the Me-109 F. Soviet aircraft were armed mainly with machine guns, there were a very small number of I-16 aircraft with cannon armament, and The Yak-1 aircraft have just entered production.

An important factor was the enemy’s organization itself. The Luftwaffe is clearly a branch of the military in Germany, which reported directly to the Reichsmarschall and then to the Fuhrer and had its own fully structured structure. In addition to the actual aviation units, there was also rear support and anti-aircraft artillery, which was very powerful. The Red Army Air Force was not fully a branch of the military; it was rather a branch that was subordinate to the ground forces. Interesting fact: until June 30, 1941, there was no post of commander of the Red Army Air Force; there was a directorate chief. The front air force commanders reported directly to the front commanders, and this subsequently played a negative role. In addition to mobilization and organizational measures, the Soviet Air Force in 1939–40. moved to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic states, so they were forced to build a new network of airfields along the entire border. For example, this is part of the map of airfield construction in the Baltic states. Accordingly, that system of subordination to the ground forces created a very serious problem: the Soviet Air Force was stretched along the entire front from Murmansk to the Black Sea in a thin layer. Because the construction of airfields was just underway, the Red Army Air Force was forced to keep part of its forces much to the east, approximately along the Smolensk-Kyiv-Zaporozhye meridian. It turned out that the air force was divided into at least two echelons, separated from each other by approximately 400–500 kilometers. The units located in the area of ​​Tallinn, Smolensk, Orsha, Mogilev, Kyiv, Proskurovo, Krivoy Rog could not help the first echelon units in the first battles. But the construction of airfields was not carried out properly either in 1939 or 1940. '41 was the year when they tried to close these gaps. The construction of 800 operational airfields began at once, in addition, at 240 airfields they began to build such standard concrete runways, which also did not add optimism, because even a person who is not familiar with construction understands that such a gigantic number of construction projects in six months is simply impossible build.

Layout of stripes at the airport

Accordingly, here is one of the photographs of how the Red Army soldiers install a grid for pouring a concrete strip.

Laying mesh for pouring concrete strip

Distribution of forces. In the Baltics, the first aviation corps is located approximately from Königsberg to the border, and accordingly the Red Army Air Forces opposing it are located here, the 6th division, here the 7th division, here the 8th, here the 57th, and the fourth, for example, is located as far in the Tallinn, Tartu area, and in such a formation it cannot begin hostilities. It cannot conduct effective combat operations, even with bombers. That is, the Germans could use all their forces in the first strike, but the Soviet Air Force could not. Moreover, even according to the cover plan, part of the forces still had to be located along the line of the Western Dvina, that is, at a distance of about 250 km from the border, and also accordingly, I can’t imagine how they could participate in the border battle from such a perspective. This happened everywhere, not only in the Baltic states, throughout the Western Front, the Southwestern Front, and the Air Force of the 9th Army in Moldova. The Soviet Air Force entered with far from optimal composition, being divided into several echelons. Even the first echelon was then divided into two echelons along the border, and at a distance of about 250 km, and the third echelon was at a distance of 400–500 km from the border. Everyone knows from textbook data that the Luftwaffe had somewhere around 2.5 thousand combat aircraft, the Red Army Air Force had about 7.5 thousand combat aircraft in the Western districts, but it is impossible to actually use most of the forces for the above reasons. In addition, the Red Army Air Force was in the deployment stage, and if the Germans could field all of their 20 fighter groups in optimal composition on June 22, then of the 69 fighter regiments represented in the western districts, 24 were of real combat value, 7 of which were in the second or third echelons. It was simply impossible to use the notorious numerical superiority. The Soviet Air Force had to enter the battle in parts, which gave the Germans an excellent opportunity to defeat them, which subsequently happened.

The preliminary part, unfortunately, is not so rosy, but, nevertheless, it really happened. Being in such a formation, in such a state, with such forces and preparation, the Soviet Air Force, I must say honestly, did not have the slightest chance of winning the preliminary battle. They could only delay the inevitable defeat of the first echelon and wait for the arrival of the second and third echelons in order to continue the battle with a more powerful force.

Let's move on to the war itself. Here, for example, are the results of the first strike. The western and northwestern directions were planned for 4 am, that is, the German planes were supposed to cross the Soviet-German border with the first salvos of the artillery offensive, and after 15–20 minutes they had already struck the forward airfields. In the southwestern and southern direction it was an hour later, apparently due to light conditions.

Here is the Kaunas airfield, its southern part. The same parking lots that we saw in the first episode, bomb craters are visible. Not everything is visible, because I had to crop the picture a little.

Kaunas. result of the bombing

People who say that it was impossible to destroy such a large number of aircraft on June 22 are sinning against the truth, because this is confirmed by objective data from German control. Shooting on June 23, this is photo control. And this is what it looked like on earth. This is the same parking lot, hangars, there are planes standing in three rows. It can be seen that the second row is completely destroyed, the back row is completely destroyed, but in the first row there is something more or less alive left. The shooting was carried out on these two planes; in fact, they were also half burned.

Kaunas. The result of the bombing

This gives an idea of ​​the effectiveness of the German strikes. In reality, on June 22, the Red Army Air Force faced an incredibly strong enemy, persistent in achieving its goal, and there was no chance of winning this confrontation, at least not in the first operation.

These are photographs from Signal magazine - the same group of aircraft, but from a different angle. Here is the spread of this “Signal”. Here are all the photos from the Baltic states - these are Kaunas, Kedaniai, Alytus, a visual German report on the hostilities.

Signal Magazine

As for the very first point: another negative factor was that on the morning of June 22, there was no agreement among the military-political leadership, and for a very long time a clear order to start hostilities was not given. In fact, there was no surprise as such, because the troops of the Soviet border districts began to rise on alarm long ago on June 22, and in the Baltic states on the 19th–20th the planes were dispersed where possible, due to airfield construction, to field airfields , and one squadron was always in readiness number two, that is, ready to take off within 5–10 minutes. But for some reason this completely normal state was violated on the night of June 21-22 by the notorious “directive No. 1,” which was handed over to the troops at about one in the morning on June 22. The following postulates were stated there: during an attack, do not get involved in battle, and do not return fire until enemy aircraft open fire. This greatly upset the mood of Soviet commanders and pilots. In films of the Soviet era, we saw where, roughly speaking, Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, or some other characters call Tymoshenko, the People's Commissar of Defense, and say: “Well, look, the Germans are attacking.” And in response they are told not to give in to provocations, to remain calm, and so on. Instead of clearly and clearly telling the commanders how to act, they were given a choice: either to attack, or to fight, or not to fight, to wait, maybe this is a provocation. And in the context of the Air Force, this played a negative role, because while the ground forces did not enter the battle everywhere on June 22, the Air Force on June 22 entered the battle in almost full strength. This moment, when the first blow was not reflected, had a completely negative impact in the future. Even Kaunas, the destroyed airfields that we saw, was done during the first raid, although the Germans did not set such a goal of destruction in this first raid. For them, it was more of a sighting exercise; basically, they set the task of conducting additional reconnaissance and once again clarifying the targets. However, where they had excellent intelligence documents, they acted in powerful groups. Several airfields were destroyed in the Baltic states, and our Air Force suffered serious losses. The situation was the same in Ukraine and Belarus. Even the very first strikes were very effective. But I emphasize once again that this was not their main task, the main one was additional exploration. What happens next is this: some Soviet military leaders who were presented with such a puzzle solved it in the normal way: for example, in the Baltics, the commander of the Air Force was Alekei Ivanovich Ionov, an aviation major general.

Ionov A.I., Major General of Aviation

Here he is, still a brigade commander, in his pre-war rank. He most likely received an order from the chief of staff of the North-Western Front, Klenov, to conduct military operations, and in response to the first strike, they raised (I honestly don’t know if a cover plan was introduced, but at least orders, which were assigned to the formations, clearly corresponded to the cover plan), bomber regiments were raised into the air and went to bomb German airfields and other targets. For example, a man, at that time a captain, Mikhail Antonovich Krivtsov, he was the commander of the first Soviet squadron, which dropped bombs on Tilsit on the morning of June 22.

Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich

There is an interesting fact associated with this man, which, again, speaks of the role of the individual: a directive put a choice in front of people, and the most decisive commanders acted decisively, such as Ionov, Krivtsov, a number of other commanders, while others simply sat on the ground and did not succumb to provocations, some regiments did not even take off into the air. And those who took off obeyed the order not to open fire first, and the German Air Force suffered very small losses in the first raid because of this. Not only did the directive not regulate these actions, but when the planes of the Northwestern Front were already approaching German airfields, bases, etc., from the People's Commissariat of Defense or from the General Staff, it is now difficult to say whether an order was received by radio to turn around and bomb not to be produced on German territory. One squadron of the 46th Sbap returned from a combat course. But people like Krivtsov showed determination, their own opinion and still dropped the bombs, thanks to which the Germans received at least some kind of retaliatory blow at that moment. Further more.

All planes were returned and they were allowed to operate only up to the border. At about 7:15 a.m. there was the so-called “directive No. 2,” which again did not allow the plan to be put into effect; it spoke in “interesting” language and set local tasks. There was a completely incomprehensible phrase to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel - it is not clear why it was said. Otherwise, it was allowed to shoot down enemy planes, act in the tail, that is, after the strike, pursue the enemy plane and bomb its units, but, unfortunately, it arrived in the districts by 9 am. What is 9 am? The Germans carried out the first series of attacks at 4–5 am, the next series was at 7–8 am. The goal of the latter was not only a reconnaissance mission, but also the destruction of aviation at airfields. The second raid of German planes was focused on materiel, additional reconnaissance, that is, the German pilots had already visited German airfields once, they had no questions, they acted clearly. Several regiments in Belarus were simply completely destroyed as a result of these raids. Indeed, completely, they then did not act at all. For example, the 113th and 16th bomber regiments were completely destroyed, not a single one of their aircraft took part in any operations after that. This is not an isolated case. When the directive arrived, because of these morning stop orders, apparently, the comrades were a little on edge and were already afraid to produce some independent things, and this directive also raised questions for them. Interesting fact: in the documents of the 125th high-speed bomber regiment of the Air Force of the Western District, the division commander persistently, several hours after receiving the directive, tries to force the regiment commander to fly out on a combat mission, he finally, at about 11.45, agrees to do this, and asks to give Every 5 minutes he receives a radio message on board to see if the order has been cancelled. This is what people have been brought to by such nonsense. As a result, his last doubts disappeared when they listened to Molotov’s speech about the declaration of war in the air at 12-odd o’clock. By such actions, before lunch, aviation was put in the role of a manager: either we are at war, or we are not at war. Many said and wrote that the connection was interrupted. Many units, whose connection with their superiors was interrupted, actually worked better, because, having no connection, they began to conduct combat operations, without looking at anyone, making a decision on their own. Before lunch, the Germans managed to carry out three, if we take the Baltic states and the Western Front, and two sorties, if we take the South-Western Front, against our airfields. The effect was devastating.

Now, if we take Tilsit, these were the results of the first flight of nine of Mikhail Krivtsov’s 9 sbap, which was the first to drop bombs on the Tilsit railway station.

Tilsit. The result of the bombing

These are the results of SD-2 strikes on Vilnius airfield. The burned-out Chaika and, possibly, its “killer” are visible; here you can see that the pylon for SD-2 is suspended.

Result of SD-2 strikes on Vilnius airfield

Accordingly, the Western Front - the forward airfields of three divisions were attacked, on which by 10.00, after the second raid, they were completely defeated, for example, in the 10th division - 74th regiment, 33rd regiment, 123rd regiment. In the 10th mixed division, the 124th and 126th regiments were defeated. In reality, there remained in the regiments: in the 33rd - not a single aircraft, in the 74th - not a single combat-ready aircraft, the 123rd IAP was able to withdraw 13 fighters, the 126th IAP was able to withdraw 6 fighters, the 124th - 1.

I have one interesting comrade from Poland who said and wrote several times: “Mikhail, this is impossible, only a nuclear strike...” Well, everything was possible, this is confirmed by our documents, not German ones, it is precisely the documents of the Red Army Air Force that confirm this level losses. At an airfield with 50–60 aircraft, in 2–3 sorties the Germans could destroy almost all the equipment. Well, of course, these were both destroyed and damaged cars. But a damaged plane, if your engine crankcase is punctured or even the tires are shot, you cannot repair in the near future.

The 13th Sbap was completely destroyed, the 16th Sbap of the neighboring 11th Division, and the 122nd IAP received heavy defeats. Thus, by 10 am the situation was completely unbearable. There is a telegram, intercepted by the Germans, from a commander from Bialystok, Chernykh, who almost openly asked for help. Ultimately, the only thing he was allowed to do was withdraw to the Pinsk-Baranovichi-Volkovysk-Lida line, that is, 100 kilometers. And by 12 o’clock these formations, almost in full force, with only one fighter regiment remaining, were redeployed to the second line. But then it came into force that the Red Army was just unfolding, that is, there was no mobilization, so the rear services were in a peacetime state, so retreat and quickly transfer the materials that were available: bombs, a supply of fuel and lubricants, to the airfields of the second runway, to which relocated, it was difficult. The airfields were in the process of being built, there weren’t even garrisons there, and there were mostly builders, units that were constructing the runways. But even this withdrawal did not guarantee anything: the Germans already bombed the Lida and Pinsk airfield in the afternoon. It is interesting that units from the Bialystok salient first retreated to the Bialystok area, they were bombed from there within 2-3 sorties, and they, too, were forced to travel further after lunch. Having moved to the second line, the regiments did not conduct combat operations due to lack of material resources and became passive witnesses. Approximately the same situation arose in the Baltic states, but with the addition that the energetic commander of the Air Force was constantly trying to act according to his plans. He was one of the few leaders of the Red Army Air Force who understood that it was necessary to fight for dominance until the very end, but, unfortunately, on June 22, certain circumstances did not allow him to do this. Why? I have already said that the Air Force is subordinate to the ground forces, to the ground commanders. At 8–9 o'clock in the morning there were breakthroughs of German groups on Taurage and Alytus, so the front commander or chief of staff - it is difficult to establish who really led this - gave the order to strike these retractable tank wedges, respectively, the entire Northwestern Air Force front were focused on fighting these units. That is, German planes continued to attack new Soviet airfields or repeat attacks on old ones; they operated throughout the day, without stopping, even in small groups. The Soviet Air Force did not respond to them in principle, acting against the motorized units of the Wehrmacht.

The belated reaction of the Western Front, what I already described, the commander of one of the regiments asked for a radiogram to be sent to him every 5 minutes on board, whether the flight had been cancelled. A little later, General Pavlov gave the order for active military operations against the enemy, around 5.30. An order was issued for actions against German airfields, but at 6–7, “amateur activity” was prohibited, and the Air Force stood for several more hours under a hail of blows. The Western Front Air Force strikes were late, but they happened. By the way, what’s interesting is that one of the regiments, the 125th Sbap, as I already said, attacked the Berzhniki airfield in the Suwalki salient. The Nine attacked, bombed, even damaged one German plane and returned completely without losses. There was also an airfield in Biała Podlaska, this was even later: one of the 130th Sbap also attacked, and the Germans had losses. The most interesting thing is that the SB was bombed from a height of 5 kilometers and still hit. To be objective, only two attacks were carried out on German airfields: one airfield in the Suwalki salient, Berzhniki, and one in Biała Podlaska, in the Brest region, to the west.

Plan for the location of the air force in the Baltics

Despite these timid attacks, on June 22, in the morning in the Baltic states and in the afternoon in the area of ​​Suwalki and Brest, they were practically ineffective (the loss of three aircraft was worth nothing). However, after this, the Germans did not use fighter aircraft in repeated attacks, but used them for loitering and even carried out an airfield maneuver, that is, they transferred fighter regiments to their airfields so as not to be under attack. This again suggests that if the Red Army Air Force had acted according to the cover plan for German airfields, no matter how effective it was, we now understand that most of the airfields would have been attacked in vain, since there would have been no German aircraft there. However, the actions themselves, like a magnet, would attract German planes and, accordingly, would not give them the opportunity to attack Soviet airfields. And so it happened: the regiments of the advanced Western Front were thrown back from the border before lunch on June 22, in the Baltic states the same process occurred after 2 hours. As soon as the sorties against the German columns ended, most of the units were immediately moved to the Riga area, in the area of ​​Daugavpils, Mitava, that is, most of the airfields, and most of the airfields of the district were generally located within a 200 km zone, they were abandoned and the units moved to a distance of 200– 250 km from the border. Accordingly, the advanced units of the Soviet troops, which were still fighting on the borders, were thereby completely deprived of support from fighters. That is, while the bombers could still fly quite normally with a bomb load, the fighters were practically unable to operate from such a distance. The departure from the Baltic states had been suggested even earlier, and commanders at all levels asked for it, but the task was to bomb tank columns, and they still carried out these sorties and only after that redeployed.

The situation was approximately the same in the Kiev Military District. The Germans also attacked virtually advanced airfields along the entire border period, starting from Kovel to Lvov, along the border to Chernivtsi. The Germans had the audacity in the confrontation with the Kyiv Military District, having a limited number of forces, to even bomb Kyiv. Neither Minsk was bombed on June 22, nor Riga was bombed, but for some reason Kyiv was, although the Germans had very limited forces in the Kyiv district zone. KOVO itself had the most powerful air force, more than 2000 aircraft, and most importantly, most of the fighter air regiments of the Kyiv district were personnel, that is, they could repel German aircraft, which was done. The Luftwaffe suffered the greatest losses precisely in the zone of the Kyiv Military District. For example, the 3rd group of the 51st bomber squadron operating in the area of ​​Stanislav and Lvov lost about half of its strength, that is, 15 aircraft. The 7th squadron of the 3rd group of the 55th squadron, which in the first flight bombed the airfield in the area of ​​Brody and Dubno with 6 planes, of the 6 planes that took off, lost 2 over the target, 2 burned out (one fell on Soviet territory, one landed at the airfield there , but burned out), and two were damaged with wounded shooters and landed at the airfield in Klimentsovo. That is, the Soviet Air Force also gave a very definite answer if the commanders had the determination to act without orders from above. But, nevertheless, all airfields were practically attacked, some airfields were simply destroyed, for example, the airfield of the 62nd Shap Lisyachich was attacked several times, and literally in the first flight 50 aircraft were destroyed. The Chernivtsi airfield was attacked twice, but even after the first sortie, most of the 149th was destroyed. The neighboring airfield was also attacked, most of the 247th IAP was destroyed, and the total losses somewhere reached 100 aircraft.

There is an opinion that in Moldova, through some incredible tricks, the district command managed to avoid defeat due to the fact that they were dispersed among operational airfields. I want to say that this is a myth. The fact is that the Germans were separated from the Romanians somewhere along the meridian of Chisinau, and, accordingly, the German 4th Air Corps, which was based in Romania, operated precisely at airfields in the Chernivtsi region. A little west of Chisinau there was an airfield of the 55th IAP, Balti, which was attacked several times on June 22, and also suffered heavy losses, which were not reflected in the reports, which gave the opportunity to some of the officers of this district to write in their memoirs, to promote themselves that they succeeded . Although, in fact, if their opponents were not the Romanians, but the Germans, most likely, the fate of the district air force would also be sad.

In the Kiev Military District, Soviet units practically did not retreat to airfields; only some units withdrew on June 22, including from Chernivtsi. Why did this happen? In fact, the strip from Kovel to Stanislav (on the Ukrainian side) is a rather undeveloped strip, and there was a problem with airfields in general. Therefore, the Germans had airfields quite far from the border, and our closest airfields in the Lvov region were somewhere 100 kilometers from the border. Accordingly, German planes were forced to operate at full range in some places and were unable to achieve decisive success at all airfields with bombing. They suffered heavy losses.

The command of the Air Force front, apparently, did not even try to draw any conclusions. In addition, according to some reports, the front air force commander Ptukhin was already removed from leadership, and, apparently, on June 22 did not even participate in combat planning. At least there is no serious combat order.

Diagram of the deployment of air force units on the Western Front

If we take the Baltics and the Western Front, who at least tried to act on German airfields in response, then there was no 9th Army on the Southern Front and in the Air Force, although reconnaissance activities were carried out. If anyone has read Pokryshkin’s memoirs, he describes a reconnaissance raid on Romanian airfields around lunchtime on June 22, when he arrived, reported to the command, and was told: “Sorry, we will have other goals.” And the Air Force of the 9th Army in the afternoon received an order to bomb the crossings on the Prut, and from the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd regiment was given the task of bombing German tank units that crossed the Bug and advanced on Vladimir-Volynsky. That's all.

That is, on June 22, by 18:00, the Soviet Air Forces in the Baltic States and Belarus were driven to the rear line of the airfields, practically no military operations were conducted after 18:00, and the only thing they could do was patrol, patrol over their own airfields, and cover it. The Luftwaffe finished its sorties at the airfields somewhere later, around 20 o’clock, but it was already “catching up” when German reconnaissance officers discovered that detour to the rear line and tried to reconnoiter in order to continue the operation the next day. The same thing happens in the zone of the South-Western Front, the Southern Front. The enemy completely controlled the sky over the forward lines, the Red Army Air Force practically did not participate in patrolling over the borders, forward units, and the only thing that happened was a blow to the German troops who were crossing the Bug in the Vladimir-Volynsky area.

The Germans, by their actions on June 22, especially in the first half of the day, ensured dominance in the zone of the North-Western and Western fronts somewhere at a distance of 200-250 km from the border, completely knocking out Soviet units from there. They were not yet completely defeated, but they were defeated, and the territory remained with the enemy. In the Southwestern Front, many units were also driven out of their airfields, not all, but very many. When leadership of the Southwestern Front was resumed on June 23, almost all units were redeployed further, deeper into the territory, 50–100 km, that is, to the Ternopil and Rivne region. A situation arose when there were no Soviet air units about 200 km from the borders. For a fighter, 200 km at that time was just a matter of flying and returning; there was no time for an air battle. The units that were along the border had already lost complete cover. Conclusion: thanks to its unique training, its technical capabilities, perseverance in achieving goals, a well-formed plan, and tactically competent actions, the Luftwaffe, unfortunately, managed to defeat the Red Army Air Force on June 22.

Loading ammunition

What could be the positive aspects? First: there was no defeatist mood, despite the fact that many are now trying to create some kind of image of scurrying pilots and fleeing generals. All this is obvious nonsense. Part of the Air Force of the North-Western Front and part of the Air Force of the Western Front retreated, having strictly received orders, but if they had retreated earlier without an order, they could have saved part of the forces, part of the funds. The Soviet pilots did, in my opinion, everything possible. There are confirmed episodes of 4 or even 5 ramming attacks. Quite fierce battles took place along the entire front line. However, the Germans were not “whipping boys”; they gained very serious experience in Western Europe, and besides, they, on occasion, tried to avoid serious military clashes. As an example, these are the actions of the 1st German bomber squadron against the Liepaja airfield. The 148th Fighter Aviation Regiment was based there. The Germans, using such a simple technique as approaching from the sea, destroyed and damaged 41 aircraft of this regiment in one day. There were no German fighters there at all. There were no serious air battles for the reason that the Germans came in, bombed and dived towards the sea. On I-153 it was very difficult to catch up with Yu-88. This served, at one time, as one of Solonin’s theories when he found an operational report of the North-Western Front, where it was written that there were 14 aircraft losses per day, and on the morning of the 23rd in Riga there were 27 aircraft of the regiment. And he says: “Where did the 30 cars go?” In fact, due to inconsistencies in operational documents, only the very first operational report of the regiment or combat report reached the front headquarters. After this, the battles for Liepaja began, and accordingly, the regiment’s headquarters began to move towards Riga and try to retreat. Apparently, the data was not transmitted, so only the first encryption message reached front headquarters, which mentioned 14 destroyed aircraft. Then there were more losses, and the last loss was around 8 pm, when by chance the Germans, apparently, got in at the moment when the planes were refueling and destroyed almost the entire squadron. But this again suggests that the Germans did not stop acting. They had success in the morning, they did not stop developing it and, characteristically, even attacked targets that had already been abandoned by Soviet units. Some airfields, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, there were no combat-ready units of the Red Army there at all, there were rear services, there were planes that had no pilots, or they were faulty, old and subject to transfer to other units. However, the Germans continued to hammer until the evening, thus depriving pilots who could have moved there from other airfields and picked up materiel from such an opportunity. The Luftwaffe did not intend to end the fight for air supremacy on June 22, and what they had succeeded in, they happily continued on June 23, and began even earlier, at about 3 o’clock in the morning.

Some Soviet commanders understood this very well. Alexey Ivanovich Ionov, for example, as soon as the opportunity allowed him, as soon as they completed the battle with German mechanized units, he took the regiment to the Dvina line. Even before the appearance of Directive No. 3, which implied a Soviet attack on Lublin, he had already given the order on the morning of June 23 to act according to the cover plan. Just as pilots, regiment and squadron commanders spent the whole day trying to counteract the enemy as best they could, so at the level of Air Force commanders there were people who were well versed in the situation, understood and tried to respond adequately. Unfortunately, the tools that were available at that time did not yet allow this to be done fully. That is, it was almost impossible to fight the Luftwaffe that was there at that moment. One more point: anti-aircraft artillery could have protected us from the first strikes, to a certain extent. Why did this happen? The Red Army was in the stage of reorganization, most of the anti-aircraft units in the territory of western Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states were in the process of formation. Many people remember from Soviet films, especially when they make accusations and say: why were your anti-aircraft divisions somewhere at the training ground? The answer is obvious: the anti-aircraft gunners carried out combat coordination, because for most of the Red Army soldiers of these units it was their first year of service, and they still had to train. Again, the Red Army was not mobilized, so the regular units of anti-aircraft machine guns that were available at each airfield were not only understaffed and instead of 9 machine guns they had only 3, well, quad Maximum installations, but they also felt a shortage of personnel , and there was simply no one to put many machine guns into operation. Unlike, again, the Germans. The Luftwaffe had a completely different organization, and the anti-aircraft units were subordinate to the Wehrmacht, and less, most of the anti-aircraft units and anti-aircraft guns were subordinate to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe command could build an umbrella over whatever arrangement they saw fit. Accordingly, the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht were in combat-ready condition at the beginning of the war and had a huge amount of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If in the Soviet Union before the war they produced about 1.5 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns of 25 mm and 37 mm, which the troops practically did not have time to master, because they were mostly released at the end of the 40th and the beginning of the 41st and were just beginning to join the troops. In addition, there was a very big problem because there was very little ammunition for these anti-aircraft guns. All the documents that we looked at were 1 ammo in the unit, and in the warehouses of the districts there were no 37-mm shells at all, as well as 85 mm for heavy anti-aircraft guns.

What conclusion could be drawn from this and why was it not drawn? Probably, that defeat was morally difficult, so there was no serious analysis. Some commanders of formations wrote reports in hot pursuit, but they were still unable to rise above the situation, accordingly, everyone had their own opinion, no one analyzed it, did not collect it, and reports on the combat operations of the Southwestern Front, Northwestern and Western , they were made: Southwestern - in August 1941, Western Front - generally at the beginning of 42. By this time, at the headquarters of the Western Front Air Force there were no longer people who participated in all these events, that is, the reports are half-hearted, to be honest, about nothing. The situation was not analyzed, no conclusions were even drawn as to why this unfortunate cruel defeat occurred. Subsequently, in 42-43, the Soviet Air Force stepped on the same rake. There are no examples when an attack on German airfields could end with such an effect as that of the Luftwaffe. For example, push back Luftawaffe units from these airfields and gain air supremacy over some area, even a local one. That is, no instrument was created, it even seems to me that it was not created throughout the war, any adequate instrument, nor were any specialized bombs prepared technically. This lecture was intended largely to say that history teaches no one anything. The fact that it was possible to draw conclusions and then effectively conduct military operations - unfortunately, was not analyzed, did not materialize into conclusions or instructions. The Red Army then, unfortunately, followed the same rake for almost the entire war. And it is impossible to even remember such serious operations as those carried out by the Luftwaffe. The events of the Battle of Kursk are often cited, supposedly there was something there, but recent studies show that the preparatory things, when attempts to destroy raids were carried out in May-June, failed miserably and were akin, for example, to the attempts on June 25, 1941 to bomb Finnish aviation from military operations. The same thing: the lack of serious targeted reconnaissance, specialized ammunition, and strike tactics. The Germans must be given their due: they continued and expanded this operation, that is, on June 23–24–25, they bombed Soviet aircraft in this zone, somewhere around 200–250 km. This was the last line, because, as we saw, the configuration of the new border, mainly airfields were built on these annexed territories. And after that, strictly speaking, the Soviet Air Force had a paradoxical situation; they were forced to retreat to the area of ​​Pskov, Smolensk, Mogilev, Proskurovo, Kyiv, and so on. The retreat was irreversible, vast spaces were no longer covered by anything, and the Germans could do whatever they wanted there. Soviet aviation was no longer there. Literally on the 26th, relocation began to an even more rear line 400–500 km from the border, and the fighting, in general, was still ongoing. Lvov was taken on June 30, the battles for Riga took place on June 27–28–29, Minsk, respectively, everyone also knows when the encirclement was closed at the end of June. They lost air support, all because of the actions of the Luftwaffe. This is not connected with defeatist sentiments, with a reluctance to fight, with a lack of fighting spirit and patriotism. In no case. People on the ground did everything they could. They fought to the last opportunity, having that technique, that preparation. Many died heroic deaths. We don’t even know most of the heroes - the same Krivtsov who was the first to drop bombs on German territory. He died in the 44th regiment commander; he was not even a Hero of the Soviet Union. The same Ionov - he, unfortunately, was arrested on June 24 in a large group of aviation commanders. A person has a completely unique destiny. He was a pilot back in the First World War, then went through all the stages of his military career, commanded a squadron and a brigade for a very long time, graduated from the academy, participated in the Finnish campaign as the chief of staff of the 14th Air Force Army, and acted in the most adequate manner in the border battle. This man had a clear focus, a clear understanding of the essence of the first operation and many processes in general. His talent lay not even in the field of knowledge, but in the field of military art. However, he was arrested and shot on February 42 with a large group of commanders, although I believe that this man was worthy of becoming an air marshal and commander of the Red Army Air Force.

In conclusion, maybe I’ll add a spoonful of honey to our sad story. The only place where the Soviet Air Force managed to defend its airfields, and to defend them for a whole month, was Moldova. In Moldova there were Romanians who were not at all as professional as their colleagues in the Luftwaffe, plus they did not have the same tools as the Luftwaffe, that is, technical training, ammunition, reconnaissance, and so on. The first flights of the Romanians were akin to the Soviet ones. The Romanian Air Force, allocated for combat operations, all ended up at the Bolgarika airfield, this is in the Izmail region, only one Soviet fighter regiment, the 67th, was based there, and all day the Romanians tried to bomb this regiment, attack, and as a result they lost more than a dozen aircraft, actually confirmed shot down. At the same time, the regiment itself lost a meager amount: one pilot with the plane in the air, 5 planes damaged and two more pilots wounded. That is, the whole day the regiment fought off all the Romanian Air Force, in fact, and did not give the slightest opportunity to the descendants of the Roman patricians to do anything. That is, all groups were scattered, defeated, and suffered losses with minimal losses to the Red Army. In many ways - the role of the individual. The chief of staff of the regiment developed tactics, this is confirmed in documents and memoirs - patrolling in large groups over the airfield. He constantly kept one or two fully equipped squadrons over the airfield, they replaced each other, and only single groups of aircraft could break through to the airfield, completely by accident, which could slip between patrols. Here's the story. If the 4th Luftwaffe Air Corps had not operated in parts of the Southwestern Front in the Chernivtsi region, but had attacked Chisinau and Odessa, I think the outcome would have been different. And so this allowed the Soviet units in the area of ​​Izmail, Chisinau, Odessa to make their feasible contribution to the beginning of victorious actions.

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Group of Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the Brest fortress, which was visible from our observation points, they were changing the guards to the sounds of an orchestra. The coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops."

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German serviceman who crossed the border Bug River by swimming. The defector was sent to the detachment headquarters in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers stationed in Finnish ports began to mine the exit from the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier identified himself Alfred Liskov, soldiers of the 221st Regiment of the 15th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. He said that at dawn on June 22, the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was transferred to higher command.

At the same time, the transmission of Directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts began from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible on the fronts of LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO. An attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. “The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.”

The units were ordered to be put on combat readiness, to secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and to disperse aircraft to field airfields.

It is not possible to convey the directive to military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures specified in it are not carried out.

Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Photo: RIA Novosti

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm.”

3:05 . A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt roadstead.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The fleet's air surveillance, warning and communications system reports the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea; The fleet is in full combat readiness."

3:10. The NKGB for the Lviv region transmits by telephone message to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

From the memoirs of the chief of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Without finishing the interrogation of the soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant’s office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken...”

3:30. Chief of Staff of the Western District General Klimovsky reports on enemy air raids on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reports on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. Commander of the Baltic Military District General Kuznetsov reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

“The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov is calling Stalin and reports the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Tymoshenko and Zhukov arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is convened.

3:45. The 1st border outpost of the 86th August border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. Outpost personnel under command Alexandra Sivacheva, having entered into battle, destroys the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Border Detachment, including the 1st Border Outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, come under heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. Border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic special military districts report the beginning of hostilities by German troops on the ground.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, and there were a large number of dead and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Wehrmacht Infantry Division begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Residents of the capital on June 22, 1941, during the radio announcement of a government message about the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

“Protecting not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe”

4:30. A meeting of Politburo members begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of a war and does not exclude the possibility of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg presented to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov“Note from the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government,” which states: “The German Government cannot remain indifferent to the serious threat on the eastern border, therefore the Fuehrer has ordered the German Armed Forces to ward off this threat by all means.” An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

5:30. On German radio, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels reads out the appeal Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the start of the war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to speak out against this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow... At the moment, a military action of the greatest extent and volume is taking place, what the world has ever seen... The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby save everyone.”

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the beginning of hostilities against the USSR: “The German army has invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!”

“The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves a directive to repel the attack of Nazi Germany: “The troops with all their might and means attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.” Transfer of “directive No. 2” due to saboteurs’ disruption of communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the combat zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.

10:00. From the speaker's memories Yuri Levitan: “They’re calling from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city,” they’re calling from Kaunas: “The city is burning, why aren’t you transmitting anything on the radio?” “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” A woman’s crying, excitement: “Is it really war?..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From a report from the headquarters of the 45th German division about the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are resisting fiercely, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized a defense with infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. Enemy sniper fire resulted in heavy casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers."

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov reads out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: “Today at 4 o’clock in the morning, without making any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed us with their planes attacked our cities - Zhitomir, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Raids by enemy planes and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the bandit attack and expel German troops from the territory of our homeland... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally our ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours" .

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree “On the mobilization of those liable for military service...”
“Based on Article 49, paragraph “o” of the USSR Constitution, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Baltic special, Western special, Kyiv special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North -Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization. The first day of mobilization is June 23, 1941.” Despite the fact that the first day of mobilization is June 23, recruiting stations at military registration and enlistment offices begin to operate by the middle of the day on June 22.

13:30. Chief of the General Staff General Zhukov flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the Main Command on the Southwestern Front.

Photo: RIA Novosti

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blocked in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Head of the Italian Foreign Ministry Galeazzo Ciano states: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops entered Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st border outpost of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded commander of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a systematic withdrawal remains open. There is now plenty of evidence both for and against this.

What is surprising is that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Heavy artillery fire is conducted only in the northwest of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation."

Of the 485 border posts attacked, not a single one withdrew without orders.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis took the positions of the 1st border outpost. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev was one of hundreds committed by border guards in the first hours and days of the war. On June 22, 1941, the state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of which were attacked on the very first day of the war. Not one of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

Hitler's command allotted 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet border posts held their defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outpost. Forty-five outposts fought for up to two months.

Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The workers of Leningrad listen to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for weeks.

“The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland”

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the believers with a message: “Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all kinds of agreements and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. She endured trials with him and was consoled by his successes. She will not abandon her people even now... The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All armies, except the 11th Army of Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, came as a complete tactical surprise to the enemy along the entire front. Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers were everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in a barracks arrangement, the planes were parked at airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken off without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.”

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive with the task of defeating Hitler's troops on the territory of the USSR with further advance into enemy territory. The directive ordered the capture of the Polish city of Lublin by the end of June 24.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. June 22, 1941 Nurses provide assistance to the first wounded after a Nazi air raid near Chisinau. Photo: RIA Novosti

“We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can.”

21:00. Summary of the Red Army High Command for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Kristinopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of Kalwaria, Stoyanuv and Tsekhanovets (the first two are 15 km and the last 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and populated areas, but everywhere they met decisive resistance from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy aircraft.”

23:00. Message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o'clock this morning Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before had generously lavished his assurances on the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were at war...

No one has been more staunchly opposed to communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word that was said about him. But all this pales in comparison to the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers as they stand on the border of their native land and guard the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes; their mothers and wives pray—oh, yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, patron, their protectors...

We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to pursue a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.”

June 22 came to an end. There were still 1,417 days ahead of the most terrible war in human history.