During the major Soviet offensive in the winter of 1941-1942, the goal of which was the defeat of the German Army Group Center, the troops of the Kalinin Front under the command of General Ivan Konev with the forces of five armies and one cavalry corps (total number of 1 million 59 thousand people) had before themselves the task of destroying the 9th German Army opposing them.
After Soviet troops took Kalinin, they went on the offensive on a wide front east of another Volga city - Rzhev. January 4, 1942, Soviet motorized brigades of the 29th and 4th shock armies. having bypassed the enemy, they were already 8 kilometers west of Rzhev.
Hitler gave the 9th Army the order: “The 9th Army doesn’t take a step back! Hold the line on the Volga, at all costs!”
Winter paralyzed all advances of German troops. But it gave the Red Army soldiers a great advantage. They had not only motor sleighs capable of moving through deep snow, good quality winter clothing, but most of all, which, unlike the German ones, did not fail in severe frost.
In mid-January, advance detachments of General Belov's Soviet cavalry corps reached the Sychevka area south of Rzhev and cut the Rzhev-Vyazma railway. At the same time, three airborne brigades were landed in the Vyazma area, and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps broke through the enemy defenses in the Yukhnov area in a northwestern direction and found itself deep in the rear of German troops, heading to join forces with units of the Kalinin Front.
This created a real threat of complete encirclement and encirclement of the entire 9th German Army.
The position of the Germans was critical - in fact, the 9th Army found itself in a half-cauldron, with completely exhausted soldiers, without reinforcements and reserves. The communication system between units and unified coordination of command were disrupted, the supply of food and ammunition to the troops via the only railway stopped and, on top of that, the army commander, Colonel General Strauss, was out of action.
On January 16, 1942, Panzer General Walter Model was appointed commander of the 9th Army.
Small, wiry and agile, he was popular in parts of the 41st Tank Corps. Everyone knew that where Model was, there was a tangible presence of military success: where he was, the most daring plans succeeded, the most critical situations were resolved. And it was not only the exceptional clarity of the orders he gave - everywhere, at the very front positions, the commander appeared personally. He could unexpectedly jump out of an all-terrain vehicle near battalion headquarters or ride on horseback through deep snow to the front lines, where he inspired, scolded, instructed, and ultimately went into the attack at the head of the battalion with a pistol in his hand. Largely thanks to this presence on the front line, the fate of the upcoming battle was decided.
The model understood that defensive actions alone could not change the situation. “Attack, seize the initiative from the enemy, impose your will on him,” was the recipe Model prescribed to his subordinates. And although the overwhelming numerical superiority was on the side of the enemy (five Soviet armies - the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st and 39th armies - acted against his 9th Army), he went on the offensive.
It started at a temperature of 45 degrees below zero. Regimental and divisional commanders asked the army commander to postpone the operation, to which Model answered them:
- What for? It won't get any warmer tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. But the enemy does not curtail his offensive.
Model's plan looked simple. He sent the reinforced 1st Panzer Division and elements of the newly arrived Reich Division from Sychevka northwest to Osuisky to strike the flank of the advanced Soviet units. On January 22, Model ordered the 6th Corps to attack from the area west of Rzhev, striking the Soviet units of the 39th and 29th armies. At the same time, the 23rd German Corps - cut off in the Olenin area - struck from the west, heading to link up with the 6th Corps. The operation of two wedges of the German offensive against the Soviet breakthrough between Nikolsky and Solomin was carried out by German units at the limit of their strength, but it was a success. On January 23, soldiers from the lead units of the 23rd Corps and Major Recke's battle group from the 6th Corps shook hands.
Two “snow roads” laid by the Red Army soldiers across the Volga were cut, and Soviet corps from the 29th and 39th armies (7 rifle, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry divisions) found themselves cut off from their rear communications and supply bases.
Model seized the initiative on the battlefield between Sychevka and Volga, and was no longer going to give it back to the enemy. The first thing the new commander did was strengthen the newly acquired corridor connecting the 6th and 23rd corps. Soviet troops desperately tried to break through the barrier and restore communication with their cut-off divisions. The model could not allow this.
He chose the most suitable person to accomplish the task. He knew how to find the right people to complete particularly difficult tasks. This time it was Obersturmbannführer Otto Kumm, commander of the Der Fuhrer regiment from the Reich division. Kumm and his regiment were transferred to the Volga - to the very place where the Soviet 29th Army crossed the frozen river.
Hold on at all costs,” Model ordered Kumm. “At any cost,” the general emphasized.
Kumm saluted.
- That's right, Mister General!
On January 28, Model on the southern sector of the front launched a counterattack to completely encircle the cut-off units of the 29th and 39th Soviet armies. The enemy understood what was at stake and desperately resisted.
The fight was life and death. Every forest hut in the deep snow turned into a fortress, the ruins of any house in the village into a hellish inferno. More than once critical situations were created, which could only be resolved thanks to the superhuman efforts of mortally tired soldiers. During the day, Model spent about an hour studying maps, and the remaining ten were with the troops. Everywhere he appeared, the insanely exhausted unit commanders and rank and file seemed to get a second wind.
On February 4, the ring around eleven Soviet divisions, representing the main forces of the two armies, closed.
Meanwhile, Kumm with his regiment of 650 people, who took up positions near the village of Klepnino along the ice-covered Volga, day after day repelled the attacks of fresh units of the Red Army rushing to join their encircled divisions. It was there, in that place near Klepnino, that the fate of the battle for Rzhev was decided.
Despite its small numbers, Kumm's regiment was well equipped. At the forefront there was an 88mm anti-aircraft gun. The anti-tank destroyer company was armed with 50mm anti-tank guns. The heavy weapons company consisted of a platoon of light infantry guns, and two more platoons had 37mm anti-tank guns, as well as a battery of assault guns from the 189th battalion. But even in this situation, the forces of the defenders still remained more than modest compared to the masses of the attacking Soviet units, consisting of several rifle and tank brigades.
For three weeks, Soviet units constantly attacked day and night. However, they made a tactical mistake that was quite typical for them - they did not concentrate all their forces on one area of the breakthrough, and did not determine for themselves the direction of concentrating the main efforts. They threw battalion after battalion into battle, then regiment after regiment, and finally brigade after brigade.
By February 3, Lieutenant Peterman's thirteen 50mm anti-tank guns had knocked out twenty T-34s. In five hours, the gun crew of the gun stationed there was replaced three times, and the neighboring crew crushed the T-34. Two dozen destroyed Soviet tanks froze before reaching the German positions.
On the sixth day, thirty light Soviet tanks appeared in front of the 10th Company's position. They stopped fifty meters away and then began firing at infantry dugouts and machine-gun emplacements. They poured fire on them for an hour and then drove back into the forest. Two hours later, a man crawled to the battalion headquarters from the location of the 10th company. It was Rothenführer (corporal) Wagner. They helped him up and led him into the room. Heavily wounded, with frostbitten hands, he tried to get up and report to the battalion commander as expected. But he fell and reported lying on the floor:
- Hauptsturmführer (captain), I am the only survivor from my company. Everyone died.
Wagner convulsed, and a second later the 10th company finally ceased to exist.
A gap at least a kilometer wide appeared at the line. The command of the 6th Army Corps sent 120 people - drivers, cooks, shoemakers and tailors - to repair the hole. These 120 people took the positions of the 10th company, but they had absolutely no experience in conducting this kind of combat. After the mortar attack, Soviet soldiers rushed to attack them shouting “Hurray!” This turned out to be too much for the nerves of the rear guards. They ran and were killed one by one like rabbits.
When it got dark, the Red Army soldiers were only 50 meters away from the headquarters of the Kumm regiment in Klepenin.
Starting from the regiment commander and ending with the drivers, everyone prepared to repel the attack, holding carbines, machine guns and machine guns in their hands. The staff officers were supported by an anti-tank gun and soldiers of the 561st Anti-Tank Fighter Division, who were now fighting as infantrymen.
No matter how many times the Red Army soldiers rushed to attack, they were unable to get closer than 15 meters to the headquarters. The words of combat reports from the battle area are striking in their monstrous simplicity: “On the approaches to Klepenin there were mountains of corpses lying around.”
The corps sent an infantry regiment to help. But Soviet soldiers killed him almost completely. On the night of February 6-7, the enemy finally broke into the positions of the 2nd company with the forces of the battalion. The brutal hand-to-hand combat lasted four hours. The 2nd company of the regiment "Der Fuhrer" was killed down to the last man.
At this moment, a motorcycle battalion of the Reich division arrived in Klepnino. In addition, units of the 189th Assault Gun Battalion under the command of Major Mummert were transferred to help Kumm. 210mm mortars entered the position and poured fire from their shells on the Soviet infantry that had broken through the "Russian Grove". The grove changed owners ten times. After the eleventh attack it remained in the hands of Major Mummert's 14th Reconnaissance Battalion.
Kumm confidently held his position at the northern end of the large pocket. The relief brigades of the Soviet 39th Army were unable to cross the Volga. They bled to death. The bodies of dead Soviet soldiers lay in thousands along the bend of the Volga.
The battle was coming to an end. The Soviet 29th Army and the main part of the 39th were destroyed. Model, who received the rank of colonel general on February 1, managed to turn the tide of events in the winter battle on the Central Front. The following data speaks about the scale of the battles and their bloodshed: 5 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, 27 thousand remained on the battlefields. Six Soviet rifle divisions were completely destroyed, and another nine, plus five tank brigades, were seriously battered.
The Germans also suffered heavy losses. On February 18, when Obersturmbannführer Otto Kumm reported to division headquarters, Model happened to be there. He told Kumm:
I know that there is almost nothing left of your regiment. But I can't do without you. What is the current number of personnel?
Kumm pointed towards the window:
- Mister Colonel General, my regiment has been built.
The model looked out the window. Thirty-five soldiers and officers stood in front of the headquarters.
Story by Fritz Langanke, reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd SS Division "Reich"
After a stop at a repair shop, we drove our 8-wheel armored reconnaissance vehicle from Warsaw through Minsk, Smolensk and Vyazma, heading to Moscow, all the way to the exit from the city of Gzhatsk. We were driving along country roads. It was very difficult to get the car moving on Russian roads and in the coldest winter of the century. It was in this city (Gzhatsk) that transport of all types of the German army stopped, filling the entire road, during the long night of January 19, 1942. Whole crowds of field gendarmes hopelessly tried to organize an exit from Gzhatsk and direct traffic along bypass roads to the main one. Screams, screams and terrible curses constantly accompanied this chaotic process. Various cars that were either stuck in the snow or simply wouldn’t start were mercilessly swerved off the road and thrown onto the side of the road. Intersections and the main highway were kept free of cars so that auxiliary units of the formations located in the Mosalsk area to the east of it could easily reach the place they needed.
It was terribly cold and I, along with the machine gunner, got out of the car, trying to warm up by moving around a little. Being inside the car when the engine was not running could be compared to sitting in a block of ice. We started moving, then stopped, driving only a few meters, until finally, having spent hours on this, we arrived at the exit from Gzhatsk and were about to leave it. I told the driver to keep to the right, but he continued to move straight until the anti-tank gun shield hit the snow wall that had formed on both sides of the road. Immediately there was a group of field guards near us who wanted to remove our car from the road, but they soon became convinced of the futility of their attempts, since our car was too heavy. Accompanied by their terrible curses, we drove back and forth several times until we were finally able to get onto the road again. Subsequently, the terrain allowed us to leave the road and, following a large radius, we were able to reach the end of the city. There was a strong east wind and that night the temperature dropped to -40 Celsius. The lubricant in the needle bearing was too viscous, so turning the steering wheel was only possible with great difficulty. The next day we tried to somehow make his progress easier, but we didn’t know how to do it.
For this reason, I left the car with its crew, and I myself went alone to the location of our company (1st company, reconnaissance battalion, SS division "Das Reich"). On January 21, I learned that the command post of our division was located in Mozhaisk. On the highway, I was able to catch a passing car, which was moving east, until a little later, all traffic completely stopped. Along the entire length of the road that the eye could see, all the columns stopped and most of the drivers and crews of the cars got out of them, observing a stunning natural phenomenon in the northeast. The snow shone brightly in the cold wind, the diverging rays of the sun almost blinded us, and in the sky there were two rainbows, mirrored from each other, touching each other at their peaks. Thousands of Landwehr people must have watched this phenomenon in fascination and could not forget it throughout the war.
In Mozhaisk, only a small unit remained, left to pick up the last things. The reconnaissance battalion was advanced to Sychevka, where, at a temperature of -45 C - -48 C, a counterattack of Russian divisions began, which crushed the German defenses near Rzhev. It lasted until the beginning of February. This was the beginning of the winter Battle of Rzhev - one of the most important battles in Russia. Near the company command post, in a large dark building, there was an evacuation hospital. Here all the mercilessness of the winter war was clearly on display. From the back of the building, amputated arms, legs, feet and hands were piled under the windows all the way to the window sill. They were thrown here after operations (in those terrifying winter conditions, losses from frostbite exceeded combat losses).
The next day, through Sychevka, I reached the location of my battalion, which was located in the village of Svineroika. Pigweed was captured the day before after a very difficult fight. It was a village with 3 or 4 streets with houses located along them. For our “brotherly unit” - the motorized rifle battalion, this day was especially cruel. In the battle for the village of Pisino they lost 250 people (out of 450), of which 4 officers and 170 soldiers were killed. After the battle, 450 dead Russian soldiers remained on the battlefield.
I, along with 3 or 4 of my comrades who arrived from Mozhaisk, were warmly greeted early in the morning by the temperature dropping to -51;C. The entrance to the village was a kind of elevated crossroads where a destroyed German gun stood. The wind blew away all the snow from there and piled it into holes and hollows, where its depth was more than a meter, which is why this place was completely open, as a result of which this point was perfectly covered by our Russian friends. As soon as anyone passed here, the Russians immediately opened fire from all types of tank and anti-tank guns from any distance. Breathing heavily, we finally reached the company command post, located at the end of the street descending from the hill, where we were greeted by the smiling faces of our friends. It was obvious that they were watching our Russian roulette with great interest. They then informed us that there was a 50/50 chance of crossing the area in daylight, and they clearly felt that I had never had to pull off such a feat since I had been sent to the repair shop that one time. while they, stupefied by the cold, did this almost every day.
I reported to my commander, Hauptsturmführer Poschka, who was stationed in the corner of the hut serving as the command post, which in the following days was reinforced with several rows of ceiling and wall coverings, so that, in the end, it could pass for a decent bunker. With him in the hut was Untersturmführer Prix from the first company. But my game with luck did not end that day. Untersturmführer Prix stood with me at the window and began to explain to me the current situation; At that time, a mortar shell flew through the window directly between the two of us and crashed into the back wall without exploding. Prix's face was cut by small pieces of wood and glass, but no one could call those scratches a disturbance, it looked as if he had been cut by a razor - just a minor incident.
Some time later I was outside with Sepp Rinesch from Steinmark (front driver) and Rudi Toner (radio operator and rear driver), who, together with Hermann Buhler (machine gunner) and Untersturmführer Prix, constituted the crew of the last 8-wheeler reconnaissance vehicle remaining in the company (4 There were no more wheeled cars left). They had just begun to explain what had happened over the past weeks when a shell hit the ground at a decent distance from us. It was so far away that none of us tried to take cover. But still small fragments reached our group and two of our comrades were wounded in the stomach. The wounds were shallow, so Sepp Rinesh jokingly shouted: “Hurray, first news!” But despite this, they were taken to the dressing station.
For this reason, I switched to their car as a driver, together with Hermann Burel from Balingen (Swabia) as a machine gunner. He was one of those guys who could be blindly relied on in any situation - after an armored vehicle similar to ours was hit in Pukhovitsa in the Pripyat swamps (then the entire crew died in a burning car), we were always glad to see in his crew Buhler and Wimmer Kreis. Despite the fact that he lost his big toe from frostbite during the retreat from the Ruza line and despite the fact that it was very painful for him to walk, he did not stay in the hospital and came back to our company. But when somewhere in the dugout he took off his boot to change the rag that covered the place where his finger had been, the stench was so terrible that we were close to throwing him outside into the snow and frost.
Our reconnaissance vehicle was limited in its capabilities. After repairs, two tires were flat, but the gun turret did not rotate - it was simply locked, so in terms of fire, our vehicle looked like a self-propelled gun. But in these critical days, without a doubt, he was an invaluable and powerful support for the infantrymen buried in the snow. At that time, there was a week when the night temperature several times dropped below -50 C. The slightest impurity in gasoline (water, for example) instantly clogged the carburetor, and then it was necessary to disconnect the carburetor from the fuel pump, which was extremely difficult to do at such terrible temperatures. This could only be done for a couple of minutes, after which it was necessary to climb into the dugout again to warm up. The cold and extraordinary rage caused streams of tears to flow down his face. These were some of the hardest days I experienced during the war. Every two or three hours you had to run to the engine and start it to keep your car running.
On the very first night, an event happened to me that later haunted me in nightmares. Until then, I had not yet been privy to all the details of that area and woke up Hermann Buhler so that he would go to the car with me. We climbed inside the car and drove for some distance, all the while turning the steering wheel back and forth, developing its system. Suddenly, the steering wheel stopped turning. I jumped off the car to see what was going on. Looking under the car, I was shocked for the rest of my life. There was a Russian lying on the frame of the car and it seemed that he was holding one wheel. Several seconds passed before I came to my senses again. Dead Russians covered in snow were scattered throughout Svinoroyka. I ran over one of these dead soldiers and his frozen limbs were completely in the lower part of the car. We tried to get him out of there, but it turned out to be impossible.
Finding no other option, I grabbed a saw, crawled closer to the Russian and sawed off his hands. It was extremely creepy. The Russian was an older man - a typical guy with a long beard. Our faces were very close to each other. Of course, the saw moved his body a little and it seemed that he was shaking his head disapprovingly. I almost lost my mind, but there was no other way out. Only a few incidents during the entire war shocked me in the same way.
The Winter War is completely different from any other. There was no longer a clear and visible front line. Buildings, any shelter from the cold were the first goals for everyone (and of course, the basis of all tactical planning). Anyone who, after spending several hours on the front line, could not warm up in any structure, had a very small chance of surviving at such low temperatures.
Without the ingenuity skills of people of all ranks and ranks (skis, sleds, homemade devices for adapting weapons and equipment to low temperatures and previously unknown problems associated with the cold, while the supply of supplies was very irregular) and without unshakable confidence in the ability to withstand everything trials and ultimately defeat the enemy... even outstanding command would not be enough to win this winter battle for Rzhev. Fortunately, this type of command was present in us in the person of the exceptional commander of the 3rd Army, General Model. Mostly at night, or when there was a blizzard and the snow was covering the eyes, reconnaissance patrols or small units penetrated small towns and villages or disrupted communications between them. Although everyone said that the enemy front was to the west and north of us, Russians could appear in even greater numbers from the east and south. To be an orderly, an orderly, sending wounded soldiers to the rear (for the most part, volunteers were volunteered for this), going for supplies - all this was suicidal and very often ended in death. When in the night we heard the alarm signal “The Russians are here!”, sometimes 2-3 times a night, after which one hut after another was illuminated by gunfire, Hermann Bühler and I jumped out and ran neck and neck to the car, simultaneously climbing into him. Like many of my comrades, he did not trust automatic weapons - too many automatic weapons jammed at such low temperatures. He always used a Russian carbine, as for me, I always kept my machine gun under my fur jacket and it never let me down. We could clearly distinguish the Russians against the background of white snow, since in this area they did not have winter camouflage suits and they were clearly visible in their brown overcoats. Thus, we quickly discovered them, although their usual “Hurray!” was now heard only sporadically. The next morning, most of the dead were already covered in snow. Hand-to-hand combat broke out here and there as the attackers got too close. Once in a similar situation, mostly by accident, Hermann hit his bayonet directly into the heart of a Russian, instantly his body went into spasms and at night he was already a frozen corpse. The next morning we found him in the same position - facing our car, with one leg bent at the knee, with his body standing straight, with his arms in the position in which he was holding his rifle when death overtook him. Only the rifle fell down.
When a bullet hit the face, small frozen droplets of blood could sometimes be seen radiating from the entrance hole on the icy soldier. Frost at -50 can do things you wouldn't see under any other conditions. This was war in its terrible and terrible form.
It was part of the general offensive of the Red Army and lasted until April 1942. The main role in this operation was given to the Western Front, which advanced with nine armies and two cavalry corps and delivered the main blow in the Vyazma region. The main blow to the enemy west of Rzhev was delivered by the 39th Army under the command of Major General Maslennikov.
Concentrating on a narrow section of the front, the tanks, after a short artillery preparation, broke through the fascist German defenses west of Rzhev. On January 12, 1942, the 11th Cavalry Corps under the command of Colonel Sokolov and the 29th Army of Major General Shvetsov were introduced into a breakthrough 8 kilometers northwest of Rzhev, up to 10-15 kilometers wide. The 29th Army was tasked with expanding the bridgehead west of Rzhev, holding the flanks at the point of breakthrough of the enemy defense, and with divisions of the left flank, together with the 31st Army, capturing Rzhev.
However, the Soviet command underestimated the enemy's strength. At the beginning of February, the 29th Army found itself completely surrounded west of Rzhev in the Monchalovsky forests.
In March-April 1942, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, trying to fulfill the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, continued offensive battles. But instead of attacking, we often had to fight off fierce enemy counterattacks. Until the end of March, the enemy did not weaken pressure on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, which was formed 170-250 kilometers west of Moscow as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the first military winter.
The total losses of the Red Army in the first Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942) amounted to 776,919 people, including irretrievable losses, i.e. those killed on the battlefield - 272,350 people and sanitary losses, i.e. those who left for medical battalions and hospitals - 504,569 people.
The relative calm that had established since the spring of 1942 on the front north and west of Rzhev was used by Soviet and enemy troops to prepare for the upcoming summer battles. On the Rzhev salient, fascist German troops created a deeply echeloned defense zone by mid-summer 1942. Each settlement was turned into an independent defense center with pillboxes and iron caps, trenches and communication passages. The Soviet armies on the Rzhev salient also created strong defensive fortifications by mid-July.
On July 16, 1942, the day before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the command of the Western and Kalinin fronts the task of the offensive Rzhev-Sychev operation. The most important feature of this operation was to be its surprise.
On July 30, 1942, troops of the Western Front attacked German positions in the area of the village of Pogoreloe Gorodishche. Having broken through the German defenses, Soviet troops advanced 15-30 km in the direction of Sychevka station. On August 7-10, 1942, in the area of the villages of Karmanovo and Karamzino, the Germans launched a strong counterattack on the advancing units. In this battle, one of the largest tank battles in the early period of the war, up to 1,500 tanks participated on both sides. German troops, led by the commander of the 9th Army, General Model, managed to repel the Soviet onslaught. The advance of the Red Army in the Sychevsky direction stopped.
Following the Western Front, the Kalinin Front went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Rzhev. On the approaches to the city, the Soviet onslaught was stopped. By August 23, 1942, both fronts, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went on the defensive.
According to the archives of the Ministry of Defense, the Red Army lost only in the initial period of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation - from July 30 to August 23, 1942 - 193,383 people killed and wounded.
In September, the struggle for Rzhev became more fierce. Having broken through the German defenses, Soviet units entered the city, where fierce street fighting began. The Germans managed to recapture Rzhev at the cost of enormous efforts. In general, the summer-autumn offensive of the Red Army using the frontal attack method at the tip of the ledge did not bring the desired results. According to German data, the Red Army lost about 400 thousand people in it. By mid-October the fighting had subsided.
A new Soviet offensive in the area began on November 25, 1942. It was prepared by Georgy Zhukov. The operation had the goal of encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group Center with flank attacks from two fronts - the Western (commanded by General Konev) and Kalinin (this front was commanded by General Purkaev). Despite their numerical superiority, the Red Army was unable to achieve success. The strike group of the Kalinin Front broke through German positions south of the city of Bely, but the troops of the Western Front, which were supposed to advance towards it, were unable to complete their task.
Having repulsed the onslaught of the Western Front, the German command organized powerful flank attacks on the broken-through units of the Kalinin Front, which failed to expand the breakthrough zone. Some of them were cut off and surrounded. As a result, the Headquarters had to take new forces from the reserve (in particular, Siberian divisions) in order to rescue the trapped formations. The soldiers and commanders who fought for several days in the most difficult conditions of winter encirclement had to be withdrawn to the rear.
On December 15, 1942, the Soviet offensive ceased. The losses of the Red Army in this three-week winter battle amounted, according to German data, to 200 thousand people.
On February 6, 1943, the commanders of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, Generals Purkaev and Sokolovsky, received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on preparations for a new Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation. The task was again set to encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. Four armies of the Kalinin and eight armies of the Western Front were involved in the offensive.
The fascist German command, having used up all its reserves in the winter battles and fearing that after Stalingrad they would end up in another “cauldron” at Rzhev, proved to Hitler that it was necessary to leave the Rzhev-Vyazma bag and shorten the front line. On February 6, Hitler gave permission to withdraw the 9th and half of the 4th armies to the Spas-Demensk-Dorogobush-Dukhovshchina line.
On March 2, 1943, at 14:30, the Soviet armies received the order to go on the offensive. The German command has already begun the systematic withdrawal of its troops from line to line under the cover of strong rearguards. By the end of the day on March 2, Soviet troops occupied the villages of Kokoshkino, Malakhovo-Volzhskoye, Trostino and others. The 359th division captured the village of Kosterovo in the second hour of the night on March 3, the 220th division reached the Moscow-Velikiye Luki railway line by morning, and at 11 o’clock in the afternoon, after a short battle, it captured the Monchalovo station, the 369th division, with a night attack, knocked out the German rearguard units from the village of Petunovo and occupied the village of Tolstikovo.
The left-flank 215th and 274th rifle divisions of the 30th Army under the command of Major General Kupriyanov and Colonel Shulga attacked Rzhev directly. On the night of March 3, having occupied the villages of Muravyevo, Kovalevo, Khoroshevo west of Rzhev and the villages of Pestrikovo, Bykhova Sloboda and Opoki east of Rzhev, these divisions approached Rzhev.
Without stopping in Rzhev, units and units of the 274th and 215th rifle divisions moved after the retreating enemy to the southwest. By March 31, 1943, the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge was cut off. The front was moved another 100 km to the west. The threat to Moscow was eliminated. For the German leadership this was a difficult but necessary loss. It is known that Hitler wished to personally hear by telephone the explosion of the Rzhev bridge across the Volga during the withdrawal of German units. According to contemporaries, this area turned into a desert.
In the second Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (March 2-31), the total losses of the Red Army were: 38,862 killed, 99,715 seriously wounded.
According to official data, more than a million Soviet soldiers and officers died in the battles near Rzhev in 1942-1943. However, according to unofficial data, losses in the Battle of Rzhev amounted to more than 2 million soldiers and commanders.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources
In a recently released documentary film by A. Pivovarov it was stated: “ according to Soviet statistics, 433 thousand Red Army soldiers died in four operations near Rzhev" The figure is quite large, but even it was considered by some to be insufficiently significant. So in the press there were statements like “ Pivovarov told what everyone knew without him: more than a million Russians died near Rzhev"(Elena Tokareva, Stringer dated February 26, 2009). Journalist Alina Makeeva from Komsomolskaya Pravda does not stop at the round million and writes “ Official data (according to many historians, greatly underestimated) admit: more than a million Soviet soldiers and officers died on a small piece of land! Rzhev and neighboring cities were completely destroyed"(CP dated February 19, 2009). Journalist Igor Elkov confidently took the yellow jersey of the leader. He writes about the Battle of Rzhev: “ The exact numbers of losses between the parties are still being debated. Lately they have been talking about 1.3–1.5 million dead Soviet soldiers. Sometimes the number sounds: more than 2 million"(Rossiyskaya Gazeta - Week No. 4857 of February 26, 2009) I draw attention to the wording in all three cases: “died” i.e. was killed. How can one not remember the immortal “Write more!” Why feel sorry for them, Basurman! It’s just a shame that the soldiers of their own country act as “basurmans”. In principle, the above estimates of losses are simply illiteracy, when general losses are confused with irrecoverable ones. However, these figures become public knowledge, and, as they say, “go to the people.”
Against the backdrop of the millions who died near Rzhev, as mentioned in the press, the NTV film begins to seem like a bright ray of truth in a dark kingdom. The origin of the number named in the film is obvious. This is the arithmetic sum in the column “irretrievable losses” from the table for the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (01/8/1942–04/20/1942) and for the three Rzhev-Sychevsk operations of 1942–1943. from Table 142 of the well-known book “Losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the 20th century.” Thus, more than 60% of the above figure are irretrievable losses in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation. The incorrectness of such a calculation is also obvious. The Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation unfolded on a front of 650 km. In this regard, it is quite strange to attribute to the losses at Rzhev those who died at Yukhnov, Sukhinichi or surrounded at Vyazma. To be fair, it should be said that A. Pivovarov is not the author of all these calculations. S. Gerasimova, who took part in the filming of the film, in her dissertation on the Battle of Rzhev confidently operates on the total losses in the Rzhev-Vyazma operation without any attempts to isolate from them the losses of Rzhev itself.
On the other hand, a significant drawback of Krivosheev’s work is the “cutting off of the tails” of operations. Those. the calculation of losses is limited to a time period that does not cover the entire time of active fighting. This, by the way, applies not only to operations carried out in the western direction in 1942. Accordingly, the period of intense fighting for the city of Rzhev itself at the end of August and beginning of September 1942 is excluded from the statistics. As a result, we get both an overcount and an undercount losses. In a word, the narrow task of ascertaining losses in the battle for Rzhev requires turning to primary sources. The main source used was the so-called “ten-day reports”, submitted with a period of ten days (ten days) to report troops about losses.
I would like to emphasize that the point is not that the above figures are too large (or too small, depending on your opinion). The fact is that they were obtained by obviously incorrect calculations. We are interested in the question: how much did the Red Army actually lose in the battles for Rzhev? Does it really deserve the status of the "cornerstone" of the Eastern Front? It must be said that the commander of the 6th Infantry Division that fought near Rzhev, General Horst Grossman, called him the “cornerstone”. Such a person is, by definition, biased and attached to the history of his connection. Silences and omissions regarding the battles for Rzhev in Soviet literature also do not prove the exclusivity of these battles. They also kept silent about the battles on Mius, which, neither in terms of the scale of losses nor in significance, do not claim to be the “cornerstone”.
Considering the battles for Rzhev in chronological order, it is necessary first of all to isolate from the total losses of the Western Front in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation the losses incurred in the Rzhev direction. I would like to emphasize that the term “Rzhev direction” is used not so much to avoid lexical repetitions as to indicate the scale of the battle. At the beginning of January 1942, the right wing of the Western Front operated near Volokolamsk. It’s not close to Rzhev, about 100 km, but it fits into the formulation “in the Rzhev direction.” The armies of the right wing of the Western Front and the left wing of the Kalinin Front actually formed a wide arc around Rzhev. In no case should this be understood as battles directly for the city. The dividing line separating the armies of the Western Front, advancing in other directions, from the “Rzhev” ones can be the Smolensk - Vyazma - Moscow highway. Those who fought north of the highway can be considered participants in the battles for Rzhev. At least on the grounds that their goal was Sychevka - a key communications hub on the railway line that fed German troops near Rzhev. Thus, we set the calculation of losses over a fairly large space. Rzhev is located about 120 km from Vyazma. That is, we do not count losses only in the immediate vicinity of the city of Rzhev. We are talking about losses for the Rzhev salient as a whole. Also, we will not waste time on trifles: count losses from January 8, 1942 and complete their calculation on April 20, 1942 (chronological framework of the Rzhev-Vyazma operation). Let's calculate losses starting from January 1, 1942 to May 1, 1942.
It must be said that the group advancing on Rzhev was not static throughout the entire period described. The 1st Shock Army participated in the battles in the Rzhev direction for a relatively short period of time. In mid-January 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Western Front and went to the Staraya Russa area. There she took part in the battles for Demyansk. Along with it, by the way, the famous 8th Guards Division left near Moscow. The Panfilov division also went to Demyansk and did not participate in the battles near Rzhev. The strip of the withdrawn 1st Shock Army was filled with units of the neighboring 20th Army. On January 21, the command of the 16th Army was transferred to the Sukhinichi area. After the completion of the operation in the Gzhatsk direction, the army formations were transferred to the neighboring 5th Army, and almost only the “brain” of one of the best armies of the initial period of the war, led by its commander K.K. Rokossovsky and chief of staff A.A., left for the new destination. Lobachev. The command of the 16th Army arrived in the Sukhinichi area on January 27. Accordingly, from January 21, the 16th Army began to report losses in the Sukhinichi direction and it must be excluded from the calculation of losses near Rzhev. Thus, the calculations include the 1st Shock, 16th, 5th and 20th Armies. At the same time, the losses of the 1st Shock Army are counted until the moment of its transfer to the North-Western Front, and of the 16th Army - until the moment Rokossovsky's headquarters is moved to the Sukhinichi ledge. The 5th and 20th armies, or rather their losses, were taken into account throughout the entire period. Actually, the 20th Army became a real veteran of the positional battles near Rzhev. One way or another, she participated in all offensive operations - winter, summer and Mars. During this period, the 20th Army was commanded by the well-known A. A. Vlasov. In March 1942 he was replaced by M. A. Reiter. The 5th Army in January-April 1942 was commanded by Lieutenant General of Artillery L. A. Govorov.
For the calculation results, see the table:
| Killed | missing | Total |
|
| 41st Army | 17063 | 1476 | 45526 |
| 22nd Army | 4970 | 18250 |
|
| 39th Army | 11313 | 2144 | 36947 |
| Total | 33346 | 3620 | 100723 |
Having survived the encirclement of the rifle and mechanized corps, the 41st Army is the undisputed leader in losses in “Mars”. The high losses of the 39th Army at the “crown” of the Rzhev ledge look somewhat strange; the rather large losses in missing persons are especially surprising. This was, generally speaking, uncharacteristic for positional battles.
It should be noted that “Mars” was not the only operational direction of the Kalinin Front in November-December 1942. Quite heavy battles, which ended in victory for the Soviet troops, took place near Velikiye Luki. The 3rd Shock Army advancing here lost almost 45 thousand people
| Killed | missing | Are common |
|
| 20th Army | 4704 | 1219 | 23212 |
| 30th Army | 453 | 1695 |
|
| 31st Army | 1583 | 6857 |
|
| 2nd Guards cavalry corps | 1153 | 6406 |
|
| Total | 7893 | 1288 | 38170 |
| * - calculated according to TsAMO RF, f.208, op.2579, d.16, pp.190–200. |
|||
Rzhev was also not the only section of the Western Front where fighting took place. However, unlike the winter battles of early 1942, most of the losses still fell on the three armies and the cavalry corps that participated in “Mars”. In the last ten days of November, the losses of all armies of the Western Front amounted to 43,726 people, and the total losses of the front for the entire November 1942 were 60,050 people.
Considering that the total losses of the entire Western Front in December 1942 amounted to about 90 thousand people (TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2579, d. 22, l. 49), the figure of losses in Operation Mars named by Krivosheev seems quite consistent with the available documentary sources. It is known from Soviet and German sources that by the end of December the fighting gradually subsided. There is simply nowhere for an overlap like the end of August and September 1942 to come from. The ratio of losses to the enemy has also improved. The 9th Army lost about 53 thousand people during the Soviet offensive, which gives us a loss ratio of approximately 1:4.
According to the last, March 1943, battle for Rzhev, more precisely, the evacuation of the Rzhev salient by the Germans, “Losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the 20th century” puts the number of losses at 138,577 people (including 38,862 irretrievable losses). At the same time, it is postulated that the losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts in full force have been calculated. However, this statement does not fit with the available documents. Thus, the total losses of all armies of the Western Front in March 1943 amounted to 162,326 people.
However, not all armies of both the Kalinin and Western fronts took part in the liquidation of the Rzhev salient in March 1943. The operation was carried out by adjacent flanks of two fronts. Those. The figure named by Krivosheev’s team can be accepted as the base one for the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation of 1943, with the caveat that it refers to the troops on the perimeter of the Rzhev ledge.
| Irreversible | Are common |
|
| Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation January-April 42nd | 152942 | 446248 |
| Encirclement of 39 A and 11 kk in July '42 | 51458 | 60722 |
| August-September '42 | 78919 | 299566 |
| Operation Mars, November-December 1942 | 70373 | 215674 |
| Liquidation of the Rzhev salient, March 1943 | 38862 | 138577 |
| Total | 392554 | 1160787 |
As a result, we get a figure of irretrievable losses that is more than 40 thousand people less than that named in A. Pivovarov’s film. The total losses turn out to be significantly lower than the 1,325,823 people stated in S. Gerasimova’s dissertation and book for the four battles for Rzhev. At the same time, our calculations significantly expand the data indicated in “Losses of the USSR and Russia in the wars of the 20th century” by clarifying the losses near Rzhev in August and September 1942, as well as the statistics introduced by S. Gerasimova for the July battles of 1942. A noticeable correction of the above figures upward is hardly possible. During operational pauses, losses were significantly lower than during major offensives.
Just in case, I’ll emphasize once again that the losses were calculated not in the battles for Rzhev as such, but in a wide arc of 200–250 km that went around the city. It should also be noted that not everyone who passes through the “irretrievable losses” column should be considered a priori dead. Many of those who were listed as missing and caught in German captivity subsequently returned to their homeland. One thing can be stated absolutely definitely: there can be no talk of a million dead at Rzhev. As well as about one and a half to two million total losses.
The city of Rzhev and its surroundings went down in history as the site of one of the most terrible battles of the Great Patriotic War. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge was formed at the beginning of 1942 after the offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts. The strategically important railway junctions - the cities of Rzhev and Vyazma, located on the direct route to Moscow along parallel highways - were not captured from the enemy. The Germans literally bit into this land. And the presence of this ledge dominated the front, creating a danger for the Soviet troops. Therefore, during 1942, our troops attempted an offensive several times, which turned out to be almost unsuccessful and led to the most difficult battles for both sides for literally every meter of land, which were accompanied by huge losses... Being in Rzhev on May 2 (that is, a week before the Day of Victory), I decided to go on foot five kilometers from the city to the village of Polunino, the battles for which became especially famous.
2. I finished my inspection of Rzhev on its northwestern outskirts. Polunino is five kilometers away. It seems that sometimes there are buses, but I decided to go on foot - it’s more interesting. Just before the exit there is the Zelenkino urban microdistrict, formed from a former village, and now built up with two-story buildings.
3. Then the city ended. There is a narrow asphalt road, and around there are spring fields, where nature awakens after winter. The grass turns green, leaves appear on the trees. Now it’s quiet here, but these places remember very terrible events.
Near Rzhev in 1942, two attempts were made to attack the city - in August-September and in November-December. Both offensives amounted to the fact that over the course of two months, Soviet troops managed to advance, at best, 45 kilometers, and even this came at a huge cost. Those who were in the battles near Rzhev, both Soviet and German soldiers, say that real hell was going on here. In particular, those Germans who had previously gone through the First World War compared Rzhev with Verdun... And for the village of Polunino, where I am going, and the nameless height 200 located near it, the fighting went on for almost a month.
4. I move on. From the city I move in a northerly direction. By the way, behind the forest, which is on the right edge of the frame, the Likhoslavl - Rzhev - Vyazma railway runs. Based on its route, it is not difficult to guess that it was she who served as the main transport hub of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead for the Germans.
5. Houses appeared on the left. This is the village of Timofevo, the name of which also appears in texts related to the Battle of Rzhev - both in front-line reports and in memoirs. The Germans created a powerful defense center from the villages located here.
6. It seems like I just left Rzhev, and it’s already quite close to Polunino. The weather, meanwhile, is very good. If all of yesterday and the first half of today there was a gloomy leaden sky with drizzling rain, then today the weather cleared up and it became quite hot.
As already mentioned in the story about Rzhev, the salient was strategically important for the Germans, but in March 1943, with the threat of encirclement created, they quite successfully and without large losses withdrew their troops from the attack, leaving the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. Operation "Buffel" led to the fact that a piece of land, for which the heaviest battles had taken place, was abandoned by the enemy almost without fighting. This state of affairs looks even more annoying for our side than for the German side, because in fact it was also not possible to organize the pursuit of German troops. This is such a difficult story - almost insignificant results of offensive operations in relation to colossal losses. And from Rzhev the Red Army learned harsh lessons, without which, perhaps the further history of the war would have developed differently (for the worse). It is most often customary to blame the command of the Western Front and Georgy Zhukov personally for such disastrous results of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk battle, but here everything is not so simple. In the case of the Vyazemsky cauldron in the spring of 1942, it was not Zhukov who acted ineptly, but rather the commander of the 33rd Army, M. G. Efremov, who died surrounded. And speaking about the Rzhev salient, you need to understand its danger in the hands of the Germans, coupled with the presence of the Demyansk salient on the other side of the front. Therefore, even the seemingly senseless attacks on the Rzhev salient performed the important task of exhausting the Germans and disrupting their plans to resume the offensive. So it is far from a fact that under a different commander than Zhukov, everything would have been much better.
8. But in any case, something very terrible happened here... Right here, where I’m walking now.
9. Halakhovo. A tiny village of a few houses. It is not difficult to guess that all these houses in local villages were built in the post-war period. In 1942, literally not a single house survived here. The war left all of them only ashes.
11. Ahead, half a kilometer from Galakhovo, you can already see a sign to the left.
12. Polunino - two hundred meters. I'm going there!
Along a short path - a bridge between two parallel roads (the second serves as the main street in Timofevo and Polunino), I enter Polunino.
13. The first thing I see here is a bridge over a stream. Nearby are children of seven or eight years old, running and playing. They were probably visiting their grandmothers for the weekend.
14. Village of Polunino. One street and two rows of houses. According to the latest data, less than a hundred people live here.
15. The first thing a person arriving (or coming) to Polunino sees is a rural library, which also houses a small museum of military glory.
16. A heavy IS-3 tank stands on a pedestal nearby.
17. The museum, most likely, has not been updated in general terms for forty years. But there is something especially soulful in this too. A pleasant elderly woman works here - the head of the library. She said that guests visiting the places where their relatives died often come here to see them. “Here,” he shows photographs, “they recently came from Kurgan. And here from the Samara region.” She also told me about how German veterans visited here back in the nineties. Search teams often work here. And from her I heard that unburied remains of dead soldiers are sometimes found even during agricultural work...
18. Topographic maps of the fighting, photographs of the people who fought here.
19. There are also those who died here in the fall of 1941, during the retreat from Rzhev towards Kalinin.
20. Dozens, hundreds, thousands of faces... All these people died near Rzhev.
21. Finds from battle sites. Probably, this part of the exhibition continues to be replenished even now.
22. I found this exhibit. I don’t know why it was placed in this exhibition, but as a person interested in the North and the Arctic, I couldn’t help but pay attention to it.
23. Children's drawings on the theme of war. Apparently, the authorship of Rzhev schoolchildren.
25. Hundreds and thousands of names. And dozens of names of villages, for each of which there were bloody battles. What about villages and heights - here there was a fierce battle for every meter.
26. Orthodox cross, erected not so long ago. Please note that at the foot of the cross lies a Soviet helmet.
27. And here is the village of Polunino itself. The battles for it began on July 30, 1942, and Soviet troops managed to liberate the village only on August 25.
29. A beautiful house with a bright room. One could mistake it for pre-revolutionary, but it is known that all the houses here were built after the war...
30. Finally I reached the northern outskirts of the village. The houses were left behind.
31. And right behind the houses is that same height of two hundred. Abundantly watered with blood in the forty-second year. Now the grass is green here, the birds are singing, the breeze is blowing (by the way, on the hill it is more noticeable than in the village). And overhead is a peaceful sky.
And the lines from Viktor Tsoi’s song “Red, red blood. In an hour it’s just earth. In two, there are flowers and grass on it. In three, she’s alive again” come to mind here more appropriately than ever. It's quiet here. But sometimes you close your eyes, and in your thoughts you seem to hear the whistle and roar of shells and machine-gun fire... It all seems so clearly here.
Made a video:
Surviving eyewitnesses of those events said that they had never seen more brutal battles during the entire war. The continuous roar of artillery, from which the earth trembles, smoke clouding the sky, constant attacks on enemy positions, as well as... fields strewn with the bodies of the dead in several layers. The picture is probably more than creepy. This, apparently, was the very “apotheosis of war.” And it becomes especially uneasy if you imagine that all this happened right here, where I am now standing with my feet. By the way, you can also turn to the memories of the enemy. This is how one of the German officers described these events:
“We moved to the front line in loose formation. Hellish fire from enemy artillery and mortars rained down on our trenches. Dense clouds of smoke covered our forward positions. The number of artillery batteries and rocket launchers of various types is unimaginable, the sound of Katyushas is indescribable. At least 40 to 50 “Stalinist organs” fired simultaneously. Bombers and fighter-bombers came and went with the sharp sound of their engines. We have never seen this before in Russia. God knows that we already had a difficult past behind us. But it seems that the worst was yet to come. We run from crater to crater to take cover from shell fragments. Another 500 meters to the first trench. The wounded are wandering towards us. They say that it is very bad ahead. Very big losses. The Russians destroyed our equipment and weapons, leveled our positions to the ground.”
32. Monument in the form of a cross (which, by the way, is missing the top crossbar). A village is visible in the background.
A very poignant poem about the Battle of Rzhev was written by Alexander Tvardovsky (better known as the author of “Vasily Tyorkin”):
“I was killed near Rzhev,
In a nameless swamp
In the fifth company, on the left,
During a brutal attack.
I didn't hear the break
And I didn’t see that flash
Right off the cliff into the abyss,
And no bottom, no tires.
And throughout this world,
Until the end of his days
No buttonholes, no stripes
From my gymnast.
I am where the blind roots are
They look for food in the darkness;
I am where with the cloud of dust
Walking rye on the hill.
I am where the cock crows
At dawn in the dew;
I - where are your cars
The air is torn on the highway.
Where is the blade of grass
A river of grass is spinning.
Where for the funeral
Even my mother won't come.
...»
33. Another small mass grave nearby. Also with helmets.
«
...
In the summer of a bitter year
I'm killed for me
No news, no reports
After this day.
Count them alive
How long ago
Was at the front for the first time
Suddenly Stalingrad was named.
The front was burning without subside,
Like a scar on the body.
I'm killed and I don't know
Is Rzhev finally ours?
And among the dead, the voiceless
There is one consolation:
We fell for our Motherland,
But she is saved.
Our eyes have dimmed
The flame of the heart went out.
On the ground when checking
They are not calling out to us.
We are like a bump, like a stone.
Even more muted, darker.
Our eternal memory, -
Who is jealous of her?
...
»
«
...
In the summer of forty-two
I am buried without a grave.
Everything that happened afterwards
Death deprived me.
To everyone that may have been a long time ago
Everyone is familiar and clear.
But let it be
It agrees with our faith.
I was killed near Rzhev,
That one is still near Moscow.
Somewhere, warriors, where are you,
Who is left alive?
In cities of millions,
In the villages, at home in the family,
In military garrisons,
On land that is not ours?
Oh, whether it’s our own or someone else’s.
All in flowers or in snow, -
I bequeath you to live.
What more can I do?
...
»
36. Near the height (the already shown cross is visible in the background) I discovered these irregularities on the ground. I wonder if these are traces of trenches?
37. The remains of an abandoned state farm, which collapsed in the post-Soviet years. It’s a pity that this is all happening in places for which they fought with so much blood.
38. Then I returned to Polunino:
39. And again, having already received a strong impression from the place visited, he went on foot to Rzhev, where on the outskirts of the city he boarded a city bus, drove to the Rzhev-Baltiysky station and boarded a commuter train to Velikiye Luki, on which he arrived in Nelidovo in the evening.
«
...
I bequeath in that life
You should be happy
And to my native Fatherland
Continue to serve with faith.
To grieve is proud,
Without bowing your head.
To rejoice is not to boast
At the hour of victory itself.
And cherish it sacredly,
Brothers, your happiness,
In memory of the warrior-brother,
That he died for her.
»
I think the last lines from Tvardovsky’s poem may be an appeal from a soldier who died in battle not only to his comrades who survived the war, but also to subsequent generations of compatriots. That is, to us. And in such places you understand this especially.
This concludes my story about the battlefields of the Battle of Rzhev.